

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 9, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 265

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Secretary of the Interior
 The Secretary of Agriculture
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The National Security Council System

The provisions of NSDM 1 and NSDM 2, dated January 20, 1969, as amended and extended by subsequent National Security Decision Memoranda, which set forth the organization and procedures of the National Security Council System, are reaffirmed and remain in effect.

The National Security Council System shall assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for national security affairs and the National Security Council shall continue to be the principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The operation of the National

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

September 21, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 269

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U.S. MBFR Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction Talks, Vienna, September 16, 1974

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. MBFR Delegation. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 241.

1. After agreement has been reached with the NATO Allies, the Delegation is authorized to begin a discussion with the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact delegations on the definition of force categories and exchange of data, subject to the following considerations:

-- A single package of redefinition measures should not be proposed; rather, individual anomalies and possible solutions should be discussed.

-- Numerical data may be given to the Pact delegations only on a reciprocal basis, except that Alliance agreed revisions to data already released may be given without exchange.

-- The Delegation shall not agree to any final definition of force categories without prior agreement on related data. The Delegation should seek guidance from Washington before committing the U.S. to any specific redefinition proposals.

2. The Delegation is authorized to begin discussion of the role of air manpower in the negotiations. In this connection, after agreement has been reached with the NATO Allies, the Delegation is authorized to inform the Pact delegations that the U.S. and its Allies are prepared to take the following actions:

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Authority NSC 6446, 4/10/96
By 1st NLF Date 4/7/97

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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August 15, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 266

TO: The Secretary of Defense


SUBJECT: Improved Security of Telecommunications

The President has been informed of the opportunities for Soviet interception of critical unencrypted Government telephone conversations which may be carried on Washington area microwave links. He has directed that immediate defensive steps be taken to counter this situation.

In that connection, he has directed that you develop, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, a specific program designed to reduce significantly the opportunities for such interception.

The program should include near term interim measures including steps to route critical Government communications on cables or wire lines until well out of the Washington area. It also should propose more comprehensive long term measures including but not limited to expansion of the availability of secure telephones useable over standard telephone lines, and alternative programs for securing the microwave links in the Washington area. Program definition for both near term and longer term proposals should include technical descriptions, costs, and scheduling information assuring highest priorities.

Details as to specific near term interim measures which can be or are being instituted and the specific dates on which they will become effective should be submitted to the President for his consideration not later than October 1, 1974. Details of longer term measures for this program should be submitted for the President's consideration not later than January 1, 1975.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Telecommunication Policy

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Authority NSC 6411, 7/16/74

By lt NLF Date 4/7/92

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET (GDS)~~

August 23, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 267

TO: The Secretary of The Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Turkish Opium Production

The President has reviewed the Interdepartmental Group memorandum of July 13, 1974, as well as the agency views submitted separately. He has instructed that the United States take the following steps in response to the recent decision by the Government of Turkey to lift its ban on opium production:

1. Enter into discussions with the Government of Turkey and relevant United Nations agencies on specific measures to prevent opium smuggling. Our major objectives in these discussions will be that the Turkish Government:

- severely restrict acreage in the first year and expand only as controls are proven to be effective;
- immediately experiment with, and ultimately shift to, more controllable agricultural and technological processes for the production of opium;
- design, install and implement a stringent control system.

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
Authority NSA Ltr, 4/16/96
By LS NLF Date 4/7/97



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2. Make clear to the Turkish Government that suspension of all US economic and military assistance to Turkey is required under Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act if it is determined that the Turkish Government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in Turkey from unlawfully entering the United States.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Domestic Council
The Director, United States Information
Agency

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Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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September 10, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 268

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Renegotiation of Bases Agreement With Spain

Taking into account the Joint Declaration of Principles signed by the United States and Spain on July 19, 1974, and with reference to the NSC Interdepartmental Group responses to NSSMs 179 and 193, together with agency views thereon, the President has decided that the United States should seek to extend the 1970 US-Spanish Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation in its present form, subject to the following guidelines:

1. Given the importance of the bases in Spain to our security objectives, and the importance of the Joint Declaration of Principles to Spain, the U. S. negotiator should seek to retain the use of all the facilities presently available to the United States, provided the quid pro quo is acceptable. To the maximum extent possible, the United States should resist efforts to place restrictions on our use of the bases in possible future crises.
2. Should the Spanish raise the question of a formal U. S. security commitment to Spain, the U. S. negotiator should take the position that the Joint Declaration of Principles responds to Spanish desires for a strong statement of the US-Spanish security relationship and that therefore the security issue as it relates to extension of the bilateral agreement should be considered as resolved to our mutual satisfaction.
3. Should the question of removing the Tanker Wing from Torrojon arise during the negotiations, every effort should be made to avoid a move. If the Spanish remain adamant, the U. S. negotiator should seek agreement by the Spanish Government to bear the cost of any new fixed installations required by the move.
4. In the event Spain raises the issue of liability and indemnity guarantees with respect to nuclear-powered warship port entry and visits of U. S. nuclear-powered warships, the U. S. negotiator should cite the

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Authority NSA 5847, 8/26/96

By 627 NLF Date 4/7/97



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unblemished safety record of U.S. warships and point out that the overwhelming political and moral obligation such an event would impose on the U.S. Government would provide the best insurance possible that any just claim would be met.

5. If the Spanish raise the question of Gibraltar during the negotiations, we should adhere firmly to our traditional position that this is a dispute between two friends in which we must remain neutral.

6. An additional objective should be to achieve Spain's support for the U.S. position in the Law of the Sea Conference concerning unimpeded transit for straits. Because we view this objective as related to our defense requirements, the subject may appropriately be raised in conjunction with the U.S. request for an extension of its base rights. The U.S. negotiator should make clear that the U.S. position on a maximum breadth for the territorial sea of 12 miles coupled with a guarantee of free transit through and over international straits is a basic element of U.S. oceans policy.

7. The U.S. negotiator should emphasize our willingness to continue non-military forms of cooperation with Spain, particularly in the areas of educational and cultural, scientific, technological and agricultural cooperation.

The President has directed that the senior U.S. negotiator should submit a report on the results of these negotiations, including any ad referendum agreement developed, for his review as soon as possible.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Security Council System will continue to be under the direction of the Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs). Communications to me relating to national security matters shall be transmitted through the Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs).

Henry A. Kissinger is hereby designated as Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs).

Richard R. Ford

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Administrator, Federal Energy Administration
Administrator, Agency for International Development
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Executive Director, Council for International Economic Affairs

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- Exchange data on air manpower.
- Discuss inclusion of air manpower in the data base for computing U.S. and Soviet Phase I ground force reductions.
- Consider inclusion of air manpower in the proposed "no increase" agreement which would limit Alliance and Warsaw Pact manpower between phases.
- Discuss the possibility of withdrawing up to 15% of U.S. and Soviet air manpower in Phase I.
- Consider inclusion of air manpower within a manpower common ceiling, provided the Pact delegations agree to the common ceiling concept.

The President has approved these additional elements of the U.S. MBFR position:


1. U.S. Phase I reductions may be in the form of units, designated in advance.
2. No U.S. forces in Berlin will be included in the U.S. reduction package.
3. Both U.S. and Soviet forces should participate in Phase II reductions.
4. Phase I post-reduction manpower levels may be exceeded for military exercises by up to 20,000 men for up to sixty days once each year.

The President has approved in principle the introduction into the negotiations of a nuclear proposal along the lines of that included in Option III described in the paper titled "U.S. Approach to MBFR," approved by NSDM 211 and presented to NATO in May 1973. The proposed reduction package should include 1000 nuclear warheads, 48 F-4 nuclear capable aircraft, and 27 Pershing surface-to-surface missile launchers. While



approving the use of this package in principle, the President has decided to defer its introduction for the present time. Therefore, Option III and the use of nuclear elements in MBFR should not be discussed with either the Allies or the Soviet and Warsaw Pact delegations without further guidance.

Henry A. Kissinger

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. A. Kissinger', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



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September 24, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 270

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State


SUBJECT: Military Assistance for Israel

The President has reviewed the NSSM 207 response and the options for military assistance for Israel which were discussed at the National Security Council meeting of September 6, 1974.

The President has decided to provide the Government of Israel with the military equipment listed in the attachment to this memorandum. The list consists of the items in 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) of the options discussed at the National Security Council meeting, plus certain additional items.

The President has directed that all items on the attached list be delivered by April 1, 1975.

U. S. government credit guarantees are authorized to provide necessary funding.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Authority: NSC 1-2.1, 4/22/96By: 1st NLF Date: 4/19/97

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR ISRAEL

Searchlight, Artillery	30
Carrier, Tracked Cargo M548	60
Cartridge 105mm, Anti-personnel M-49E3	6,000
Proximity Fuze	20,000
LAW	20,000
Propelled Charge for Breaching Minefields	176
Trucks, utility 1/4 ton (Jeep)	2,450
M725 Ambulance, 1 1/2 ton	120
Cartridge, 106mm, Anti-personnel	2,000
Cartridge, 5.56mm	100 million
Maverick AGM-65	200
Chaff RR 150/160	192,000
Hobo, MK 84	280
Chaff Bomb, MJU 1/B	2,600
Doppler Navigation System	10
Searchlight, Naval Mercury-Xenon	10
Sonar, Variable Depth	12
DST Mines	200
Torpedo MK 46	50
Field Cable, spiral	1,000
Switchboard, Field SB 22	300
Wire, Field WD 110	10,000 miles
Battery, BA 4386	100,000
Generator, D. C. 1.5 KW	570
175 Self-Propelled Gun	13
REDEYE Air Defense Missile	1,082
M88 Tank Recovery Vehicles	5
TOW Launchers	72
TOW Missiles	2,757
M60A1 Tanks	100
M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier	300
M577A1 Command Post Carrier	48
155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (M109A1)	92
M578 Armored Recovery Vehicle	4
M16A1 Rifles	80,000
Shrike missiles (AGM 45-3A and 45-4)	200

Attachment to NSDM 270

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Snowcraft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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September 24, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 271

TO: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, United States SALT Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for the SALT Talks
Geneva, September 18, 1974

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on September 18, 1974, in Geneva.

1. The Delegation should state that, in the U.S. view, the purpose of the current session is to exchange views on an agreement which will limit strategic offensive arms through 1985 and will replace the Interim Agreement of 1972. However, the Delegation should avoid discussion of the precise relationship between the Interim Agreement and a new agreement, i.e., whether the new agreement is to extend, follow, or replace the Interim Agreement.

2. The Delegation should emphasize that the United States believes that:

-- An equitable new agreement can be concluded to cover both quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms.

-- The mutually agreed objective of reaching a new agreement extending until 1985 offers new negotiating opportunities for both sides.

-- This new agreement must be an acceptable point of departure for a permanent agreement, but need not deal with all the issues which should be addressed in a permanent comprehensive agreement.

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Authority NSC 6588, 4/26/91

By LS NLF Date 4/7/92

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3. The Chairman of the U.S. Delegation should inform his counterpart that the U.S. views the current phase of negotiations as exploratory and will initially not advance specific proposals, pending a thorough discussion of the principles which might serve as a framework for an agreement through 1985.

4. The Delegation should point to the impact that the characteristics, magnitude, and deployment rate of Soviet strategic programs have on U.S. programs and force structure, especially in the absence of an effective agreement. The future U.S. strategic force level will be determined, to a major degree, by the outcome of the negotiations. The Delegation should convey the notion that the size and characteristics of the central system forces of each side are functionally related, and that the U.S. strategic force will not be less than Soviet strategic force, either in perception or reality.

5. The Delegation should state that any agreement must provide a high degree of equivalence in central strategic systems -- ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Delegation should elaborate this principle in light of the following elements of equivalence and should ascertain Soviet views on each:

a. Aggregate Numbers. The United States believes that equivalence in aggregate numbers of central strategic systems is best achieved through phased mutual reductions to a mutually acceptable common lower level.

b. Throw Weight. In order to constrain the potential destructive capability of central strategic systems, the agreement should provide for limitations on throw weight, taking into account bomber payload.

c. MIRV Limitations. The Delegation should stress the importance which the United States attaches to limiting qualitative aspects of the strategic arms competition, including the deployment of current MIRVs and the development of new MIRVs. The United States believes that the next agreement should limit the number of MIRVed missiles, taking into account the throw weight and number of reentry vehicles of permitted MIRV systems.

6. The Delegation should state that while both sides have expressed support for the goal of reductions, the two sides have not discussed this subject sufficiently to provide the basis for a specific approach. Thus,

reductions should be a major topic of discussion at this session of the negotiations. The United States believes that its preferred approach of phased mutual reduction to a common lower level can reduce the momentum of arms competition and enhance the stability of the strategic balance. The Delegation should solicit Soviet views on how best to provide for reductions in a 1985 agreement.

7. The Delegation should reassert U.S. commitment to achieving an agreement which will contribute to stability in the long-term strategic relationship between the two sides and a stable security relationship in time of crisis. The U.S. views this as a fundamental criterion for assessing the political and security implications of a possible SALT agreement. For our part, the level and composition of U.S. forces -- including new systems -- can be subject to negotiation assuming that current and prospective Soviet forces could be subject to agreed limits.

8. The United States believes that a new agreement should not codify the existing and projected programs of the two sides, but must also constrain the pace and magnitude of quantitative and qualitative developments in strategic offensive arms. In this regard, the U.S. supports the principle of agreed mutual and equitable restraint in the modernization and replacement of strategic systems.


9. Concerning land mobile ICBMs, the U.S. Delegation should reflect no change from the unilateral statement of May 1972. If the Soviet Delegation should raise the issue of land-mobile ICBMs, the Delegation should seek clarification from the Soviets on how they propose that mobiles would be dealt with in the agreement and how an agreement which included land-mobiles would be adequately verified.

10. The Delegation should reaffirm the principle that the provisions of any strategic arms limitation agreement must be adequately verifiable. The Delegation should state that there will be a need for special measures to permit adequate verification in certain cases, such as in limits on MIRV deployments.

11. If the Soviet side should raise the issue of forward-based systems, the Delegation should not enter into a discussion beyond repeating the U.S. view that mutual assurances concerning non-circumvention would form a suitable basis for dealing with non-central systems.



12. The above principles should be developed in both formal and informal meetings with the Soviets, as the Chairman of the Delegation deems most effective. In all cases, a principal aim of the Delegation will be to seek Soviet views as to these principles and any other concepts the Soviets might have for an offensive strategic agreement through 1985. The Delegation is not authorized to discuss any specific proposals the Soviet side might make, emphasizing the importance at this stage of setting a general framework for agreement.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

TOP SECRET

September 27, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 272

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
Consultative Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
Consultative Commission, Geneva, September 24, 1974

The following instructions are approved for the Standing Consultative Commission session beginning on September 24, 1974 in Geneva.

Instructions on Procedures Governing ABM Replacement

1. The U.S. Commissioner should undertake discussions on general approaches to procedures for replacement of operational ABM systems and their components. The objective of this discussion is to provide a framework for working out mutually agreed procedures at subsequent SCC sessions. The U.S. approach is that the procedures should be based on: (1) the agreed guidelines contained in the two "Protocols on Procedures" of July 3, 1974, (2) the ABM Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements, and (3) the Protocol to the ABM Treaty. The procedures should also be consistent with those procedures for dismantling and destruction previously agreed in the SCC, except as modified by these instructions.

2. The U.S. Commissioner should not put forth any proposals for specific procedures. However, he may discuss illustrative specific procedures in explaining and supporting the general U.S. approach. In so doing, he should draw on the material in the Verification Panel Working Group paper, "Criteria for An Approach to Replacement of Operational ABM Systems or Their Components," dated September 11, 1974.

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Authority *NSC 6800; 4/14/96*

By *lit*

NLF Date *4/7/97*

3. The U.S. Commissioner should emphasize that the procedures to be negotiated must prevent the limits of the ABM Treaty and its Protocol from being exceeded during the replacement process as a result of overlapping operational capabilities, but must provide sufficient flexibility to permit an orderly replacement program.

4. Specifically, the U.S. Commissioner should seek to work out a mutually acceptable approach to:

a. replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to the current ABM deployment areas.

b. replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to the exchange of ABM deployment areas under the provisions of the Protocol to the ABM Treaty of July 3, 1974. The U.S. Commissioner should emphasize that the exchange of ABM deployment areas is of such a nature that the appropriate procedures would not necessarily be the same as those for the current ABM deployment areas.

c. notification procedures consistent with the guidelines in the July 3, 1974, Protocol to the ABM Treaty as well as with the notification procedures for dismantling or destruction previously negotiated in the SCC. The U.S. Commissioner should seek to achieve notification procedures that include:

(1) the numbers, types, and locations of ABM components which are being replaced or which have been replaced,

(2) the numbers, types, and locations of replacement ABM components, and

(3) with respect to the exchange of ABM areas, the location of the new ABM deployment area.

Notification relating to replacement of components within existing ABM deployment areas should be provided at the beginning of regular SCC sessions.

d. determining when an ABM component is "under construction" and when dismantling or destruction of an ABM component must begin, both to be consistent with adequate verification requirements. The



U.S. SCC Commissioner should emphasize that it may be appropriate to define "under construction" differently for different ABM components.

e. dismantling or destruction procedures for replaced ABM systems or their components consistent with adequate verification requirements taking into account certain operational considerations, in particular in the exchange of ABM deployment areas. The U.S. SCC Commissioner should emphasize that while costs can also be taken into account, it should not be at the expense of any verification requirements.

5. Privacy of the SCC negotiations and the avoidance of leaks must be maintained. All substantive statements on SCC activities are to be cleared at the White House.

Clarification of the SCC Procedures Governing Dismantling or Destruction of Replaced Submarines

1. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the U.S. Commissioner should read into the record a statement along the following lines:

With respect to Paragraph III.2 of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, the United States interpretation of this paragraph is that dismantling or destruction of replaced submarines may be accomplished at shipyards which carry out construction or repairs of submarines.

2. The U.S. Commissioner should seek formal Soviet agreement to the above interpretation.


Pre-agreed Messages for Situations Covered by the Accidents Agreement

1. The President has approved the recommendations of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee with respect to initiating discussion of pre-agreed messages relating to the Accidents Agreement.

2. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the U.S. Commissioner should present for consideration the draft texts of the English language versions of the pre-agreed messages. As appropriate,



the U. S. Commissioner should draw on the draft Aide Memoire prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee in making this presentation.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

SECRET

October 7, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 273

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for U.S. Delegation to the PNE
Negotiations, Moscow, October 7, 1974

The following instructions are approved for the negotiations on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs) beginning in Moscow on October 7, 1974.

1. The Delegation should state that it proceeds from the assumption that the basic purpose of the negotiations is to develop a PNE agreement as called for in Article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).

2. In the initial stage of the negotiations the principal task of the Delegation will be to elicit Soviet views and proposals on the content of the PNE agreement. Toward this end, the Delegation should set forth at the outset of the negotiations the US view that the PNE agreement must satisfy the following criteria:

- a. PNEs must not provide weapon-related benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT.
- b. The fact PNE activities are not contributing to such benefits must be adequately verifiable.
- c. The agreement must be consistent with existing treaty obligations, including in particular the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).

The Delegation should seek Soviet views on the above criteria.

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Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

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Authority: AISC 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4, 1.1.1.5, 1.1.1.6, 1.1.1.7, 1.1.1.8, 1.1.1.9, 1.1.1.10, 1.1.1.11, 1.1.1.12, 1.1.1.13, 1.1.1.14, 1.1.1.15, 1.1.1.16, 1.1.1.17, 1.1.1.18, 1.1.1.19, 1.1.1.20, 1.1.1.21, 1.1.1.22, 1.1.1.23, 1.1.1.24, 1.1.1.25, 1.1.1.26, 1.1.1.27, 1.1.1.28, 1.1.1.29, 1.1.1.30, 1.1.1.31, 1.1.1.32, 1.1.1.33, 1.1.1.34, 1.1.1.35, 1.1.1.36, 1.1.1.37, 1.1.1.38, 1.1.1.39, 1.1.1.40, 1.1.1.41, 1.1.1.42, 1.1.1.43, 1.1.1.44, 1.1.1.45, 1.1.1.46, 1.1.1.47, 1.1.1.48, 1.1.1.49, 1.1.1.50, 1.1.1.51, 1.1.1.52, 1.1.1.53, 1.1.1.54, 1.1.1.55, 1.1.1.56, 1.1.1.57, 1.1.1.58, 1.1.1.59, 1.1.1.60, 1.1.1.61, 1.1.1.62, 1.1.1.63, 1.1.1.64, 1.1.1.65, 1.1.1.66, 1.1.1.67, 1.1.1.68, 1.1.1.69, 1.1.1.70, 1.1.1.71, 1.1.1.72, 1.1.1.73, 1.1.1.74, 1.1.1.75, 1.1.1.76, 1.1.1.77, 1.1.1.78, 1.1.1.79, 1.1.1.80, 1.1.1.81, 1.1.1.82, 1.1.1.83, 1.1.1.84, 1.1.1.85, 1.1.1.86, 1.1.1.87, 1.1.1.88, 1.1.1.89, 1.1.1.90, 1.1.1.91, 1.1.1.92, 1.1.1.93, 1.1.1.94, 1.1.1.95, 1.1.1.96, 1.1.1.97, 1.1.1.98, 1.1.1.99, 1.1.1.100

By: LIT NLF Date: 11/1/97

3. The Delegation should state that the US has several concerns related to how these criteria can best be satisfied; therefore, we need at an early date Soviet views on several issues. In particular:

a. What specific provisions do the Soviets propose to ensure that PNEs are used for peaceful purposes only and will not provide weapon testing benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT, particularly weapon development, military effects experiments, or testing of stockpile weapons?

b. What will be the specific rights and functions of observers?

c. What information on geography, geology, and other factors descriptive of PNE operations will be exchanged to facilitate verification?

4. The Delegation should state that, in order to systematically examine the above concerns, the two sides will need to exchange appropriately detailed descriptions of their respective PNE programs at an early time, including information on types of PNE operations and sizes and numbers of explosions.

5. With regard to the implementation of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), when this is raised by the Soviets the Delegation should state that it has no views to express on this subject at the present time, but would like to hear the views of the Soviet Delegation on how this might be dealt with in the upcoming NPT Review Conference.

6. The Delegation should refrain from discussing the relationship of PNEs to achieving non-proliferation objectives.

7. The Delegation is not authorized to negotiate or discuss any changes in the LTBT or to discuss possible radioactivity criteria under the LTBT.

8. The U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter J. Stoessel, is designated head of the U. S. Delegation.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



Kissinger

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET/GDS

October 10, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 275

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: COCOM Position on the Return of Depleted
Uranium (Tails) from the USSR

The President has reviewed the report of the Under Secretaries Committee on Tails Disposition and has noted agency views. The President has decided that we should seek to maintain our position in COCOM requiring the return of tails. If significant opposition develops in COCOM, however, we should reexamine our position with a view to finding an acceptable compromise. The President authorizes a compromise requiring the return only of tails above 0.2 percent uranium-235 content. If a satisfactory compromise cannot be achieved, the options for a revised U.S. position should be submitted to the President for his decision.

In view of the importance of securing the cooperation of other nuclear suppliers in implementing our non-proliferation strategy, we should maintain a cooperative atmosphere vis-a-vis nuclear matters within COCOM.

The Department of State should inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and other interested Congressional committees in advance of the approach being taken in COCOM and any changes that may prove necessary.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Executive Director, Council on International
Economic Policy

SECRET/GDS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC Memo, 3/10/95

By: let NLF Date: 3/10/95



UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET//RESTRICTED DATA~~

October 15, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 276

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: FY 1975-1977 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The President has approved the proposed nuclear weapons stockpile for FY 1975-1977 submitted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on August 27, 1974.

Specifically, the President approves:

-- A total adjusted stockpile of [redacted] nuclear warheads for the end of FY 1975 and [redacted] nuclear warheads for the end of FY 1976.

-- A total stockpile of [redacted] nuclear warheads for the end of FY 1977, and associated planned production of [redacted] nuclear warheads and planned retirement of [redacted] nuclear warheads during FY 1977.

The nuclear weapons stockpile levels and composition approved by the President represent authorized ceilings, not to be exceeded except as provided below or otherwise approved by the President. The ceilings are subject to change due to budgetary actions and policy decisions that affect our future nuclear posture.

For the FY 1975-1977 period, the President authorizes:

-- The production and retirement of those quantities of nuclear warheads and nuclear warhead parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved stockpiles, as well as the production of additional parts of nuclear weapons necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the agreement for cooperation.

TOP SECRET//RESTRICTED DATA XGDS

UNCLASSIFIED

Partially Declassified/Released on 3/1/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

Authority NSC 68 4/24/96

By 1st NLS Date 4/21/97

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UNCLASSIFIED

-- The AEC, in coordination with the DOD, to initiate production of such long lead time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1978 production of warheads required to support approved DOD forces.

-- The AEC to produce and transfer to the DOD parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special nuclear material, as may be agreed by the AEC and the DOD. These parts may be used in nuclear weapons, training programs, research and development, or production.

-- The AEC, in coordination with the DOD, to make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY 1975-1977 as may be necessary to reflect changes in AEC material availabilities, production/retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements; or as necessary to reflect changes as may be required by the DOD because of changes in military requirements or adjustments in delivery assets so long as the changes do not exceed ± 10 percent in each year in strategic offensive, strategic defensive, tactical, and fleet anti-submarine/anti-air warfare warhead totals.

-- The DOD to designate as retired and, in coordination with the AEC, to retain custody of nuclear warheads for a period of up to one year from the date the designation is made if necessary to reduce AEC requirements for weapon storage during periods of high production workload at AEC assembly facilities.

Any changes indicative of a significant shift in defense policy or AEC production capabilities will be submitted to the President for his approval.

The President has noted the FY 1978-1979 stockpile projection submitted with the FY 1975-1977 request. Since the FY 1978-1979 projection is for planning purposes only, the President has neither approved nor disapproved the stockpile levels or composition for these years. However, the President has indicated that extended projections are useful in developing integrated programs, and requests that an extended planning projection again be included with next year's stockpile approval request. The submission should note any additional nuclear materials production capabilities required to satisfy the planning projection. If additional capabilities are required in the recommended planning estimate, the submission should also provide an alternative planning estimate that can be satisfied within available nuclear materials production capabilities.

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The President has noted the Nuclear Artillery Modernization paper and its reference to the DOD assessment of the overall tactical nuclear posture. In view of the importance of the matter addressed to this assessment, the report containing the assessment should be submitted to the President by November 15, 1974.

The FY 1976-1978 stockpile approval request and the planning projection for FY 1979-1980 should be submitted in February 1975.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Deputy Secretary of State
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET//XGDS(3)

October 15, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 277

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: International Restraints on Environmental Warfare

The President has reviewed the report of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (USC) on possible international restraints on environmental warfare, forwarded by the memorandum of the USC Chairman on May 10, 1974, and associated agency views regarding such restraints.

As reflected in the Joint Statement of the United States and the Soviet Union on July 3, 1974, the President has decided that it is in the United States' interests to consider with the USSR restraints on the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes and, to this end, to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union to explore the possibility of such restraints.

The President has decided that the U.S. approach to these discussions should be consistent with Option 2 as presented in the USC report, which focuses on those environmental modification techniques having long-term, widespread, or severe effects.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET//XGDS(3)



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC letter, 4/26/92

By let NLF Date 4/7/97

Gen Securoff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20509

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 22, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 278

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

SUBJECT: Joint Cooperation Commissions

The President has requested the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, to review the composition and terms of reference of Joint Cooperation Commissions established since May 1, 1974, and to coordinate the work of these Commissions.

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee should review current Commission activities, and their bearing on other aspects of U. S. bilateral relations with the individual countries concerned.

Proposed positions and instructions for United States representatives in the Commissions and various sub-groups should, if they involve significant policy issues, be considered by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee in advance of Commission or sub-group meetings. In particular, this procedure should provide guidance as to the terms of cooperation agreements, and should identify problems anticipated in negotiating, implementing and/or funding agreements to be concluded in the Commissions, as well as the expected time frame for the successful negotiation of cooperative agreements in substantive areas.

The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, is requested to submit the above review to the President no later than November 20, 1974.

A separate study should analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the Joint Cooperation Commission approach, consider improvements in current concepts and criteria for the establishment of Commissions, and set forth recommendations regarding any further extension of this

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DOD, 3/1/89



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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approach to other countries and regions. This study should be submitted to the President by November 30, 1974

To assist the Under Secretaries Committee in carrying out the responsibilities conveyed by this memorandum, the following USC subcommittees should be established: Cultural Affairs Subcommittee, chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State; Economic Subcommittee, chaired by the representative of the Secretary of the Treasury; Science and Technology Subcommittee, chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State; and a Security Subcommittee, chaired by the representative of the Secretary of Defense.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)



Gen. Secorcraft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS/GDS~~

November 2, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 279

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Riot Control Agents and
Chemical Herbicides

The President has reviewed the interagency report on the riot control agents and chemical herbicides issue and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and associated agency views.

The President considers it important that the United States ratify the Geneva Protocol.

The President is therefore prepared, in reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the Protocol, to renounce as a matter of national policy (1) first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and (2) first use of riot control agents as an offensive weapon of war to facilitate or increase casualties.

The President wishes, however, to preserve the option to use riot control agents in riot control circumstances (to include controlling rioting prisoners of war), in situations where civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided, in rescue missions, and in defensive military modes to save lives. The requirements regarding authorization for use of these agents in war, set forth in NSDM 78 on August 11, 1970, remain in effect.

Prior to deciding to take this step, however, the President has directed that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, promptly undertake the necessary discussions with key Senators with the aim of achieving

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Authority *NSC 164.1; 4/16/96*

By *lit* NLF Date *3/7/97*

Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol at the earliest possible date. These consultations should include the aim of achieving favorable Senate action on the Biological Weapons Convention at the earliest possible date.

Both the fact and nature of the foregoing decisions should be closely held prior to a report to the President on the completed consultations and his approval of a public statement. This report should include consideration of providing prior notification of U.S. intentions to those allies which have taken a view similar to that of the U.S. regarding the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



GEN Secw. Goff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20526

November 28, 1974

~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA XQDS 13~~

National Security Decision Memorandum 280

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Revised Nuclear Test Program for
FY 1975 (BEDROCK)

The President has approved the revised detailed test program for the first half of FY 1975 (BEDROCK I) and the detailed program for the second half (BEDROCK II), as recommended by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. The President has also approved assignment of the Highest National Priority (DX procurement rating) to those underground nuclear tests scheduled to be accomplished prior to the March 31, 1976 entry into force of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee



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Authority NSP 6000, 4/10/96

By *lit*

NLF Date 3/11/97

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~CONFIDENTIAL/CDS~~

December 9, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 281


TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on
Gas Warfare

The President has reviewed the report of December 6 submitted by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pursuant to NSDM 279. He has approved the report and authorizes the Director to state before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

- (1) the formulation of U.S. policy toward tear gas and herbicides incorporated in the report is the President's position,
- (2) it is the President's intention to conform U.S. policy accordingly, assuming the Senate consents to ratification on this basis, and
- (3) the President continues to urge advice and consent to ratification of the Biological Warfare Convention.

The President also approves the notification of appropriate allied governments of the Administration's position on the Protocol prior to the appearance of the Director before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC Letter 4/14/93
By: JEP Date: 4/1/97

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~TOP SECRET/NOFORN~~ (XGDS)(3)

January 9, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 282

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Korean Force Modernization Plan

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 211, together with the departmental and agency views thereon, and has decided the following:

- The United States will complete its obligation to the Republic of Korea Force Modernization Plan at an early date, in order to demonstrate the United States commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea.
- The shift from grant military assistance to FMS credits should be accelerated to the rate defined in Option 2 in the NSSM response.
- No termination date should be set for grant military assistance to the Republic of Korea. The downward trend in grant military assistance defined in Option 2 should be continued beyond FY 77, but should look toward the maintenance of a modest investment and training program with an annual ceiling of \$10 million.
- The F-4D squadron now on bailment to the Republic of Korea should be transferred to the Republic of Korea by sale. The Republic of Korea should be asked to pay the \$3.3 million cost for rehabilitating the two F-5A squadrons being returned to South Korea under the Enhance Plus Agreement, but this should not be a condition for the sale of the F-4D squadron if the Republic of Korea raises serious and persistent objections.
- The review of the North Korean threat and the Republic of Korea air defense requirement contemplated by NSDM 227 should be


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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 12812, 4/16/96

By: letNLF Date: 4/7/97

forwarded with recommendations to the President no later than
March 3, 1975.


Henry A. Kiasinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



(1)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
UNCLASSIFIED

January 25, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 283

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The U. S. Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for U. S. Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), for
SCC Session on Compliance Issues

The President has approved the following instructions for the SCC Session on SALT Compliance Issues.

The U. S. Commissioner should raise the following issues along the lines set forth below.

Launch Control Facilities

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The construction of additional silos capable of launching ICBMs is prohibited by the Interim Agreement. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

Partially Declassified/Released on 3/1/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunier, National Security Council



Authorized: NSC Staff; 4/10/96
By: [Signature] NLF Date: 4/1/97


4. The U.S. air manpower proposals authorized in NSDM 269 do not require Allied air manpower reductions in Phase II and no such reductions should be proposed by the U.S. While the U.S. would be willing to include air manpower in its Phase I reductions, no commitment to the specific size of the U.S. air manpower reduction should be made at this time.

5. Combined air/ground manpower totals for U.S., Soviet, NATO, and Pact forces may be presented in support of an Alliance proposal to include air manpower in the common ceiling. However, additional force strength data should be provided to the Warsaw Pact only on a reciprocal basis, where the Pact has agreed to present comparable figures.

6. In light of the modifications in the U.S. position concerning inclusion of air manpower in the common ceiling, no further proposals should be made at this time concerning the redefinition of ground force categories.

7. No proposal concerning exceptions to post-reduction ground manpower levels, other than that authorized by NSDM 269, should be made at this time. While normal Pact rotations could be permitted under the final agreement, the terms of an exception for these rotations should be negotiated only after the Pact has explicitly proposed the exceptions it desires.

8. Until full consultations have been completed with the NATO Allies, all negotiations and discussions should be conducted within the guidance contained in NSDM 269, as modified by paragraphs 4 through 7 above.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



3/20

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

February 6, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 285

TO: The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva,
 January 31, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on January 31, 1975, in Geneva:

1. The Delegation should state that, in the U.S. view, the basis for the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms is contained in the provisions of the Aide Memoire initialed by the two sides on December 10, 1974.

2. The Delegation should call attention to the Aide Memoire provision which states that the Agreed Interpretation and Common Understanding dated May 26, 1972, relating to limitations on increases in the dimensions of land-based ICBM launchers will also be incorporated into the new agreement. The Delegation should indicate the need for additional agreements including inter alia:

-- Appropriate definitions such as those for ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy ICBMs, and ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVs.

-- An agreement on ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers similar to the Agreed Interpretation signed on May 26, 1972.

3. On the issue of defining a heavy ICBM, the U.S. Delegation should state that a heavy ICBM should be defined as an ICBM of volume or throw weight greater than the largest non-heavy ICBM deployed on either side on the date of signature of the agreement.

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4. Concerning the limitations in the Aide Memoire on air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), the Delegation should state that it is the U.S. understanding that the 600 km limitation on ASMs applies only to ballistic ASMs carried on bombers.

The President has also decided in principle that the U.S. could agree to further limitations on cruise missiles and ballistic ASMs. As a minimum the U.S. could agree to:

-- Count all cruise missiles of range greater than 3000 km in the aggregate.

-- Extend the ASM provisions of the agreement to cover ASMs launched from all aircraft, not just those launched from bombers.

However, the Delegation should not put forth this position until authorized by Washington.

5. The Delegation should emphasize that the parties must undertake not to interfere with or impede national technical means including means for verifying the limitations of the MIRV provisions of the agreement.

6. Concerning the limitation on the permitted number of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, the Delegation should emphasize the need for a frank mutual exchange on the problems which could arise in verifying such a limitation. In particular, the Delegation should describe and obtain Soviet views on the following problems:

5 -- Whether it is possible to verify which version of a particular missile is deployed when the missile has been tested with both single RV and MIRVed payloads. It is the U.S. view that any missile of a type tested with MIRVs should be counted as MIRVed when deployed.

-- Verifying which SLBM launchers in a particular SSBN class contain MIRVed missiles when there exist both MIRVed and unMIRVed missiles compatible with these launchers. It is the U.S. view that all SLBM launchers on a submarine should be counted as MIRVed if any SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed.



-- Verifying whether a particular ICBM or SLBM launcher contains a MIRVed missile if it has been modified, for example, through changes to length or diameter. It is the U.S. view that all ICBM and SLBM launchers of types modified for the purpose of permitting the deployment of MIRVed missiles should be counted under the MIRV limit. To illustrate this point the Delegation may cite for example that any SS-17, SS-18, or SS-19 type silos must be counted as containing MIRVed missiles.

-- Determining whether a launcher which once contained a MIRVed missile and has been converted to an unMIRVed launcher can be verified as no longer containing MIRVs. It is the U.S. view that the conversion of launchers which contain MIRVed missiles to unMIRVed launchers should be permitted only under procedures agreed in the SCC.

In making the above points and explaining each verification problem, the Delegation should emphasize that the U.S. welcomes Soviet proposals concerning how to solve these problems and that all such proposals will receive careful U.S. consideration.

7. The U.S. Delegation should not raise the issue of limitations on land-mobile and air-mobile ICBM systems. If the Soviets repeat their proposal to ban air-mobile ICBMs, the U.S. Delegation should state that the issue of banning air-launched ballistic missiles of ICBM range is complex and related not only to the broader issue of strategic aircraft and their armaments, but also to other types of mobile ICBMs. In this context, the U.S. would be willing to consider how provisions which include air-mobile ICBMs might be included in the final agreement and will study carefully any Soviet proposals in this regard.


8. On the issue of defining a heavy bomber, the U.S. Delegation should state that current heavy bombers include the B-52 and B-1 on the U.S. side, and the Bear, Bison, and Backfire on the Soviet side. If the Soviets claim that Backfire is not a heavy bomber, the U.S. Delegation should challenge this contention in the light of the technical capabilities and characteristics of the Backfire and methods of improvement in Backfire capability.

9. With respect to Paragraph 6 of the Aide Memoire, the Delegation should state that negotiations on further limitation and reduction of strategic arms should start as soon as possible after the new agreement is concluded, and that a provision to this effect should be included in the new agreement.



10. If the Soviets make proposals in areas other than those covered above, e.g., non-transfer, ballistic missile launchers on sea beds, ballistic missile ships or maneuvering reentry vehicles, the Delegation should not comment on these proposals and should seek guidance from Washington.

11. If the Soviets table a draft treaty early in the session, the Delegation should indicate that consideration of a draft treaty would be premature until the issues have been adequately discussed. After adequate discussion of U.S. and Soviet views, the Delegation should submit for Washington approval draft treaty provisions which could be proposed to the Soviets.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



Gen. Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ ~~CODE~~

February 7, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 286

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Long-Term US Military Force Levels in Thailand

The President has reviewed the options for long-term US military force levels in Thailand submitted in response to NSDM 249, US Deployments in Thailand.

In order to retain a credible and flexible combat capability at an acceptable cost during the next two years, the President has decided the following:

1. After the current dry season is over, reduce the US military force level in Thailand from the present 27,000 military spaces down to 21,300 by the end of FY 1975.

2. Reduce military manpower spaces from 21,300 on July 1, 1975 to 12,000 on June 30, 1976. The bulk of the combat forces involved in this reduction are to be withdrawn in the fourth quarter of FY 1976. This level should provide for a combat force of six B-52s, two fighter squadrons, one AC-130 squadron, six RF-4s, three USN P-3s, four U-2Rs, and necessary support aircraft.

3. Reduce to 10,000 military manpower spaces by December 31, 1976, with the bulk of this reduction taking place in the second quarter of FY 1977. This level should provide for a combat force of two fighter squadrons, six RF-4s, three USN P-3s, four U-2Rs, and necessary support aircraft.

4. Retain Udorn Airbase in caretaker status at least through FY 1977. Specific timing for termination of U.S. operations at Utapao and Korat Airbases will be determined later. Plan on using Udorn for training operations by tactical air units on temporary deployment from other bases in the Pacific area.

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


Authority DSG-1/11/96

By let NLF Date 4/7/97

5. The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense and the United States Embassy Bangkok, should begin discussions with the Royal Thai Government to inform them of our Thailand residual force planning, to negotiate an acceptable contract arrangement for maintaining Udorn Airbase in caretaker status, and to negotiate re-entry and rotation rights at that base. If those rights cannot be negotiated, this decision on size and pace of withdrawals remains subject to review.

6. No public announcements on these withdrawals will be made until after the respective dry seasons.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget



February 9, 1975

SECRET

National Security Decision Memorandum 287

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: Instructions for U.S. Delegation to the
TTB/PNE Negotiations, Moscow,
February 10, 1975

The President has decided that the following will be the U.S. position for the next phase of the negotiations on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs), beginning in Moscow on February 10, 1975:

1. The basic purpose of the negotiations is to develop a PNE agreement as called for in Article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).
2. To insure that contained PNEs do not provide weapons-related benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT, such PNE events could be no higher than 100 KT. There would be provision for observers, whose rights would include verifying geology, depth-of-burial, and purpose.
3. The President has decided that, in an otherwise acceptable agreement providing for contained PNEs to be limited to 100 KT, the U.S. would forego observers of contained PNEs. Alternatively, if adequate provision is made for observers, contained PNEs could be permitted up to a yield of 150 KT. However, the Delegation should not propose either of these positions to the Soviets unless authorized by Washington.
4. The PNE agreement must be consistent with existing treaty obligations, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The Delegation is not authorized to negotiate or discuss any changes in the LTBT or to discuss possible radioactivity criteria under the LTBT.

~~SECRET~~ - ~~NOFORN~~ - ~~ATT~~

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: AISC to BSC, 4/14/94

By: LCF NLS Date: 4/2/92

5. The U.S. Delegation should present the following proposal for excavation PNEs. These provisions are intended to insure that such PNEs do not provide weapons-related benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT:

a. Each excavation PNE device must have a total fission yield below an agreed maximum, but no greater than 0.5 KT.

b. To preclude atmospheric effects testing, each device must be emplaced at a depth not less than $30 W^{1/3}$ meters, where W is the yield in KT.

c. Observers should have rights which include verifying geology and depth-of-burial, taking radiochemistry samples to measure the fission yield, deploying temporary instruments to detect simultaneous and nearby contained explosions, and access to relevant areas as needed.

d. There should be agreed limits on the yields of excavation PNEs. In particular, the yield of any one salvo could not exceed 500 KT and a limit on the maximum individual yield of each excavation device would be agreed.


6. The President has decided that, provided there was adequate provision for observers, the U.S. could in principle accept alternative formulations of the yield and verification requirements set forth in paragraph 5. However, the U.S. Delegation should not propose to the Soviets any such alternative formulations unless authorized by Washington.

7. Timely information should be provided about each PNE event. This information should include purpose, location, schedule, depths-of-burial, geophysical properties, expected results, and actual results.

8. The U.S. has no objection in principle to PNE cooperation. However, verification requirements for a PNE agreement pursuant to Article III of the TTBT must be worked out before proceeding to discuss the nature of US/USSR PNE cooperation.



9. The Delegation should refrain from discussing the relationship of PNEs to achieving non-proliferation objectives.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



Gen. Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 288

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Interior
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

SUBJECT: Instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva
 Session of the Third United Nations Conference on
 the Law of the Sea

The President has reviewed the recommended instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, together with the formal agency comments relating thereto, and the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee's forwarding memorandum of March 4, 1975.

The President affirms the importance attached to gaining broad international acceptance of U.S. oceans policy positions on freedom of navigation, marine resources, marine pollution, scientific research and peaceful resolution of disputes. Subject to the following guidance, the President approves the recommended instructions for use by the U.S. Delegation.

Freedom of Navigation: The President underscores the importance attached to gaining international acceptance of law of the sea provisions accommodating U.S. interests on freedom of navigation; unimpeded transit through, under and over international straits; archipelagoes and other reasonable uses of the high seas. Subject to the consent of the senior Department of Defense representatives on the Delegation, the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation is authorized to exercise the authority requested.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 6802, 4/24/92
By LLT NLF Date 4/2/97

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Economic Zone: In implementing instructions on this issue, the Chairman of the U. S. Delegation is directed to bear in mind the U. S. preference for delimitation of the outer boundary of the economic zone at 200 miles or the edge of the continental margin, whichever is further seaward. With this understanding, the recommended instructions on the economic zone and the continental shelf are approved.

Protection of the Marine Environment: The President approves the basic objectives of the United States regarding the negotiations on the control of vessel-source pollution as set forth in the recommended instructions. If necessary to the attainment of these objectives, the Delegation is authorized to exercise the authority contained in Section 7, Options I, II and IV of the recommended instructions.

Marine Scientific Research: The authority requested in Section 8 of the recommended instructions is approved. The Chairman of the U. S. Delegation is directed to bear in mind the importance attached by the United States to the avoidance of any system which would require the consent of the coastal state for marine scientific research.

The Deep Seabeds: The President affirms the basic U. S. objectives in negotiations on the intended organization and system for deep seabed mining in the ocean beyond national jurisdiction: an organization and system guaranteeing non-discriminatory access by U. S. firms to deep seabed minerals under reasonable conditions coupled with security of tenure, and with fair and reasonable profit or rate of return to deep seabed mining operators. Within this framework, the following guidance is provided on specific issues that may be the subject of negotiation relating to the regime for the deep seabeds:

-- Parallel System of Exploitation. The proposed instructions are amended to authorize the U. S. Delegation to agree to a parallel system of exploitation on the condition that the treaty contains provisions adequately safeguarding U. S. interests in guaranteed access to deep seabed resources.

-- Commission to License Complaints. The U. S. Delegation should seek to limit any regulatory authority of such a commission, particularly in areas of tariffs, prices and production.

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By _____ NLF Date _____

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- 3 -

-- Training Program. The U. S. Delegation should seek to avoid any agreement on training involving unwanted transfer of technology in any joint ventures involving developing countries.

-- Joint Ventures with Developing Countries. In considering the possibility of developing nation participation in joint ventures, the U. S. Delegation's objective should be to limit any such participation along lines as recommended by the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, in his forwarding memorandum.

-- Tax Credits or Exemptions. The recommended instructions are amended to delete authority for the U. S. Delegation to agree to a treaty provision obligating states not to levy national taxation or to grant tax credits with respect to deep seabed mining operations.

The President approves the recommendation of the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, that the Chairman of the U. S. Delegation inform the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, concerning the entire package of proposed deep seabed measures before any final agreement.

Conference Backstopping: The President has assigned responsibility to the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee for backstopping the law of the sea negotiations. The Chairman of the U. S. Delegation is requested to submit a report on the results of the negotiations via the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, to the President, upon conclusion of the March-May, 1975 session of the Conference.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Director, Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

SECRET
XGDS



Scowcroft

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

March 24, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 289

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: US Military Supply Policy to Pakistan and India

As reflected in the public announcement of February 24, 1975, I have decided to lift the embargo on US sales of lethal military equipment to Pakistan and India. The US Government, subject to the guidelines below, should in the future be as responsive as possible to requests for the sale of defense articles and services which will meet the legitimate security needs for modern and effective forces in Pakistan and India.

Sales will be subject to the following guidelines:

--Sales of US military equipment to Pakistan and India will be on a cash basis only. There will be no grant military assistance or FMS credits for the purchase of military equipment by either Pakistan or India.

--All sales of military equipment will be reviewed on a case by case basis.

--All sales will be consistent with the overall US policy in South Asia to encourage the process of normalization and reconciliation between Pakistan and India. Sales should not stimulate an arms race in that region or restore the pre-1965 situation in which the US was a major regional arms supplier.

--At least in the initial stages, the emphasis should be on weapons and equipment which clearly enhance defensive capabilities.

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4

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NA SEC 92-64

By KSH NADA DCS 2/29/05



These guidelines as set forth above should also apply to any requests for the transfer of US-controlled military equipment from third countries to Pakistan or India.

In order to assist in the implementation of this decision in the initial stages, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council staff, shall be responsible for ensuring that each request received under this policy is reviewed and decided upon in accordance with the above guidelines and in full compliance with legal and congressional requirements. Requests with potential for major political or military impact should be referred to me for consideration.

The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for monitoring arms shipments to Pakistan and India from all sources on a continuing basis. A report summarizing such shipments and providing an assessment of the prospective military capabilities, including nuclear capability as appropriate, should be prepared for my attention semi-annually on June 30 and December 30 of each year.

Ronald R. Ford

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



Gen. Secorcraft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE XGDS

March 26, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 290

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The US Commissioner, Standing Consultative
Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for US Commissioner, SALT
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).
Geneva, March 24, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Standing Consultative Commission session beginning on March 24, 1975, in Geneva.

Compliance Issues

The following instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 283.

1. Possible Testing of an Air Defense Radar in an ABM Mode.

The US Commissioner should seek Soviet clarification of this activity. If the Soviet side claims that the information which has been provided is inadequate to identify the testing activities which concern the US side, the US Commissioner should rebut this contention on the basis that the information provided is adequate to identify the activity. If the Soviets persist in claiming that further information is needed, the US Commissioner, after obtaining approval from Washington, may explain that the US has already identified the radar in question as an SA-5 radar, and that, as is well known by both sides, the SA-5 radar has a continuous-wave signal and can operate over a range of frequencies including frequencies in the vicinity of 5700 megahertz.

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Authority: ALL AUTHORITY 3/20/98

By: let NLF Data 3/23/98



2. Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs). In discussing the issue of the definition of a "heavy" ICBM, the US side should use the term "non-heavy" ICBM as opposed to light ICBM in describing those ICBMs which would not be classed as heavy ICBMs.

3. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the US Commissioner should formally indicate that the US believes that excess Soviet ABM launchers at test ranges were not all dismantled in accordance with the SCC-agreed Procedures. The US side is aware that these launchers were deactivated prior to entry into force of the SCC Procedures. However, the US believes that these launchers should have been dismantled in accordance with the agreed Procedures. The US expects that, in the future, notification and dismantling or destruction will be in accordance with the agreed Procedures. The US Commissioner may provide additional information regarding these Soviet dismantling inadequacies which provided the basis for this concern.

4. Concealment Measures. The proposed US solution to this issue, as provided in NSDM 283, is that the Soviet side should cease these concealment activities. If the Soviets seek clarification of the meaning of the term "cease", the US Commissioner should state that it is not the US intention to require that the sides change practices that were in use prior to entry into force of the Interim Agreement. However, the expanding pattern of concealment activities initiated since that time should be halted.

US Use of Shelters Over Minuteman Sites and ABM Sites at Grand Forks.

a. The US Commissioner should deny that the US has engaged in any deliberate concealment activities.

b. The US Commissioner should reaffirm to the Soviets that, in the context of arrangements to eliminate those compliance ambiguities of concern to the US side, the US is prepared to modify its use of Minuteman shelters. The US Commissioner is authorized to state that "modify", in this context, includes our willingness to eliminate the use of the present type of shelters which impede Soviet verification by national technical means.

c. The US Commissioner is also authorized to indicate that, in the context of arrangements to eliminate those compliance ambiguities of concern to the US side, the US is prepared to forego further use



of the shelters over ABM silos at Grand Forks which concern the Soviet side. In this context, the US Commissioner should point out that these shelters are not currently in use.

d. If the Soviet side reopens the subject of prior US assurances that the use of shelters over Minuteman and ABM silos would cease, the US Commissioner should state that the Soviet side must have misinterpreted or misunderstood past US responses on this subject, and that the US side is unaware of any such assurances. However, the US Commissioner should emphasize US willingness to modify its use of these types of shelters in view of Soviet concerns, assuming that the Soviet side will take similar actions to alleviate US concerns.

6. Soviet Claim of US Violations of the Principle of Confidentiality. If the Soviets reopen this issue, the US Commissioner should respond in a low key manner and continue to emphasize that the information of concern to the Soviets was made public as a result of press leaks and not as a result of actions of US officials.

7. Inactive Atlas/Titan I ICBM Launchers. If the Soviets reopen this issue the US Commissioner should indicate that this matter was addressed in 1973, and on grounds of practicality it is not productive to discuss this matter further, since it has been years since we have operated or manufactured these systems. The US Commissioner may provide additional specific information regarding the status of these obsolete launchers.

ABM Replacement Procedures

The US Commissioner is authorized to work out, ad referendum to Governments, procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components in permitted ABM deployment areas along the lines set forth in the Verification Panel Working Group paper "SCC ABM Replacement Procedures," dated March 7, 1975.

Actions on "Measures Agreement"

1. The US Commissioner should continue consideration, ad referendum to Governments, of a system of pre-agreed messages in accordance with instructions contained in NSDM 272.



2. In response to the Soviet-proposed clarification of Article 4 tabled in the previous session of the SCC on February 5, 1975, the US Commissioner should respond along the following lines:

a. Acknowledge that the Soviet proposal is a constructive step towards clarifying the notification called for in Article 4.

b. State that the US does not see the need for further clarification, beyond that contained in Article 4, for planned missile launches.


c. Agree on the usefulness of a common understanding clarifying notification of "unsuccessful" missile launches, and propose the following specific language for an agreed clarification:

"Consistent with the obligations of the two Parties under the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement on Measures, it is understood that each Party will notify the other Party immediately, if as a result of an unsuccessful missile launch, such launch will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party."

d. The US Commissioner may, if he deems it necessary, clarify the phrase "in the direction of the other Party" by indicating that it is the US interpretation that this phrase means "in the direction of the national territory of the other Party." In this context, the US Commissioner should point out that "national territory" includes possessions such as Midway and Guam for the US side.

Sensitivity of SCC Proceedings

The President wishes to emphasize that, because of the sensitivity of the compliance issues, every effort must be made to avoid unauthorized disclosures. Distribution of this NSDM should be limited to those with a clear need to know.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 8, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 291


TO: The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U. S. Security Policy Toward Greece

The President has considered the response to NSSM 215 on U. S. security policy toward Greece submitted by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on February 2, together with the formal agency comments and recommendations relating thereto.

The President has confirmed that negotiations should proceed with Greece relating to U. S. bases and facilities in Greece and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreements, with the understanding that the following guidelines will shape the U. S. position:

-- The principal U. S. objective in the negotiations is to preserve to the extent possible the existing U. S. security arrangements with Greece while encouraging Greece's return to full participation in NATO. The United States should seek to regain full effective use of those U. S. facilities considered most important to U. S. security interests. If concessions are necessary to obtain Greek agreement to these U. S. principal objectives, the United States may agree to consolidation or reduction of facilities considered least essential to retain.



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Partially Declassified/Released on 2/26/94
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council



Authority: NSC 10/1/91
By: [signature] NLF Date: 4/7/92

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
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-- In response to Greek initiative and in return for Greek support of principal U.S. objectives, the United States may agree to the termination of homeporting.

-- The United States considers the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as the limiting framework for any agreement on the alteration of the status, privileges and immunities of U.S. forces in Greece.

In approving the U.S. position for these negotiations, the President recognizes the interconnection between US-Greek security relations and Greece's NATO ties, and again emphasizes the importance attached to full Greek participation in NATO.

The President has directed that the senior U.S. negotiator should submit a report on the results of these negotiations, including such ad referendum agreements as may be developed, for his review as soon as possible.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Gen. Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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April 22, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 292

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. - Iran Nuclear Cooperation

The President has reviewed the study directed by NSSM 219 and has noted the comments and recommendations of the agencies. The President has decided that in negotiating an Agreement on Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy with the Government of Iran, the U.S. shall:

- Permit U.S. material to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for use in its own reactors and for pass-through to third countries with whom we have Agreements.
- Agree to set the fuel ceiling at a level reflecting the approximate number of nuclear reactors planned for purchase from U.S. suppliers. We would, as a fallback, be prepared to increase the ceiling to cover Iran's full nuclear requirement under the proviso that the fuel represents Iran's entitlement from their proposed investment in an enrichment facility in the U.S. Any additional entitlement could be disposed of by Iran without importing the material into that country through sales from the United States to appropriate third countries with whom the U.S. has bilateral Agreements for Cooperation.
- Continue to require U.S. approval for reprocessing of U.S. supplied fuel, while indicating that the establishment of a multinational reprocessing plant would be an important factor favoring such approval. As a fallback, we could inform the Government of Iran that we shall be prepared to provide our approval for reprocessing of U.S. material in a multinational plant in Iran if the country supplying the reprocessing technology or equipment is a full and active participant in the plant.


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Authority: NISG 6.1.1.1 4/10/97
By: SLT NISG Date: 4/7/97

and holding open the possibility of U.S. participation. The standard provision requiring mutual agreement as to safeguardability shall apply. An expression of U.S. willingness to explore cooperation in establishing such a facility at an appropriate time should Iran so desire, may be made.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director of Central Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 3, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 293

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: US Approach toward Enhancing the Allied Contribution
to the Defense of NATO

The President has reviewed our past efforts to encourage our NATO Allies to enhance their contribution to the defense of Europe and to obtain offsets for US budgetary and balance of payments costs in Europe. He has decided to seek another offset agreement with the FRG, provided that the FRG does not strongly object in principle to a new agreement. But in general, given the recent change in the world monetary system and in economic conditions, greater emphasis should be given to encouraging our NATO Allies to increase the quality and effectiveness of their own forces than to efforts to offset US balance of payments and budgetary costs.

Our Allies should be encouraged to increase their defense expenditures, to undertake force improvement programs to upgrade their military hardware, and, most importantly, to make more effective use of existing defense resources by reducing the overlap and duplication that exists in many areas of NATO activity.

Representatives of the US Government should emphasize to our NATO Allies that their efforts to strengthen their own forces, particularly through measures increasing the cost-effectiveness of NATO's overall defense capability, will be viewed by the US Government as their most significant contribution to the sharing of the burden of NATO defense. In discussing this issue with Congress, members of the Executive Branch should stress that such efforts by our NATO

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
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AUTHORITY: ARL 100/100, 4/12/96

By L/S NLF Date 4/7/97

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Allies both increase the Allies' share of the common defense and add to the protection of our own security interests in Europe. Finally, the analysis contained in the 24 March 1975 DPRC paper on Burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance should be used in explaining the reduced relative importance of budgetary and balance of payments offset.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Council on International Economic Policy

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Gen. Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~CONFIDENTIAL - GDS~~

May 12, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 294

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Change in the Eligibility of States to be Suppliers for AID
Development Loan - Financed Procurement

The President has decided to expand the categories in which the United States would permit goods and services financed under U.S. Development Loans to be purchased from non-U.S. suppliers.

Such purchases were previously controlled by:

- para. 6(a) of NSDM 76 which provided for such purchases
"in any non-European low income country (defined as any country with per capita income of less than \$1,000) eligible to receive U.S. assistance, as well as in the United States," and
- NSDM 28 which provided authority "to untie all AID loans to Latin America for Latin American procurement." AID implemented NSDM 28 authority by ruling that it permitted procurement under development loans in the U.S. and all independent countries of the Western Hemisphere south of the United States, except Cuba.

In addition to the two categories above, the President has now decided that goods and services financed under U.S. development loans may also be purchased in any non-European recipient of AID assistance as well as in the U.S.

Henry A. Kissinger
Henry A. Kissinger



cc: The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of
Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Authority *NSC 6800.1, 4/18/96*

By *let* NLF Date *4/7/97*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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May 14, 1975


National Security Decision Memorandum 295

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Instructions Concerning Use of the Direct
Communications Link Between Washington
and Moscow

This memorandum supersedes NSAM 255, dated July 31, 1963, and sets forth responsibilities and instructions for the operation of the U.S. terminals of the US/USSR Direct Communications Link (DCL).

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UNCLASSIFIED

Partially Declassified/Released on 2/27/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

Authority NSC 1606 4/10/96

By LK NLF Date 4/7/97

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Incoming messages will be translated and delivered to the White House by the fastest secure means available. Cyrillic text will also be forwarded to the White House as quickly as possible. Distribution of messages will be made in accordance with White House instructions.

Henry A. Kissinger
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/XGDS-3

May 23, 1975


National Security Decision Memorandum 296

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT: Improved Communications Security

The President has reviewed the status of near term actions DOD has taken in response to NSDM 266 and the alternative longer term solutions proposed. The President concurs in the near term actions already underway to move critical Washington area government circuits to cable and encourages continued efforts to accelerate these steps to completion.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/XGDS-3

Classified by: Henry A. Klossinger

Partially Declassified/Released on 2/27/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council



Authority: NSC 6802, 4/16/96

Rev 1/1

NSC Date 10/7/07

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Approval is deferred on proposed long term measures and developments not addressed in this decision memorandum pending completion of the PCZ and Executive Secure Voice Network implementation plans. However, FY 1976/1977 DOD budget allocation/planning should reflect the possible need for support of concept implementation and additional supporting R&D.

The State Department is requested to review potential political implications of implementing the PCZ concept, and OTP is requested to develop proposals to permit expanded implementation of the PCZ concept with minimal risk of public disclosure of the Soviet intercept problem.

Brent Scowcroft
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, National Security Agency

UNCLASSIFIED



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

June 12, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 297

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research
and Development Agency

SUBJECT: Instructions for the US Delegation to the PNE
Negotiations, Moscow, June 3, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the negotiations on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs) which resumed in Moscow on June 3, 1975. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 287.

1. If individual explosions in a contained PNE salvo can be identified and their yields adequately measured through agreed verification procedures, contained salvos with aggregate yields up to 500 KT could be permitted. With respect to verification of individual yields for contained salvos with aggregate yield above 100 KT, the Delegation should propose use of the SLIFER technique for determining yield.

2. The Delegation should reiterate our position that all PNEs must be fully consistent with existing treaty obligations, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). In addition, it should state that US studies indicate that it does not appear to be possible to carry out major excavation PNE projects without violating the LTBT. The Delegation should solicit Soviet views on how they plan to conduct PNE excavation projects without violating the provisions of the LTBT.

3. After presenting the above position on the LTBT issue, the Delegation should reiterate the position on excavation PNEs given in NSDM 287, with the exception of continuing to propose a 0.2 KT limit on the fission yield of each excavation PNE device. In this context, the Delegation should:

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Auth: NSC letter 4/10/96

By: let NLF D&IO 4/7/97

(a) Reject the Soviet proposed gamma-mapping technique as inadequate for the determination of fission yield.


(b) Propose that the distance between any two explosives in an excavation salvo be limited to a distance greater than the emplacement depth of the deeper of the pair of explosives.

(c) Insist on the right of drillback to recover below-ground melt samples for any excavation event in which adequate above-ground samples are not available.

4. The basic means for yield verification of all PNEs should be national technical means (telescismic and photographic) augmented by provisions for information exchange and on-site observers. Observers should have rights to verify independently the information exchanged. However, for events smaller than 50 kilotons, independent verification by observers of information exchanged is not required and the US could forego the exchange of detailed geological information and detailed project descriptions.

5. The US is willing to declare an intention to cooperate in the PNE field on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit, in ways consistent with applicable domestic laws. However, verification requirements for a PNE agreement pursuant to Article III of the TTBT must be worked out before proceeding to discuss specific arrangements for US/USSR PNE cooperation.

6. The President has decided that, in principle, the US prefers a 150 KT limit on individual excavation PNEs and, in this context, would be willing to accept a one megaton limit on the aggregate yield of all salvos (contained and excavation) and forego the fission yield limit and associated melt samples verification technique for excavation PNEs. While this position is approved in substance, it should not be put forth by the Delegation until authorized by Washington.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



~~SECRET~~ XGDS

June 14, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 298


TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: FRG Reactor Sale to the USSR

The President has reviewed the paper prepared by the NSC Verification Panel Working Group on the above subject, and has noted the views of the addressees. He has decided that:

- The U.S. is prepared to grant an exemption for the FRG reactor sale now pending before COCOM if the USSR will supply the uranium for the fuel and give a peaceful purposes assurance for the reactor and its produced plutonium.
- IAEA safeguards should be required in future COCOM cases for weapon states only where the nuclear export concerned would reasonably be expected to create a significant risk of diversion of fissionable materials to non-peaceful uses.

The President has also directed that the working group prepare a study of the prospects and implications of U.S. nuclear trade with Communist countries, with a view to reconciling our national and COCOM positions.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 6802 4/16/97By let NLF Date 4/7/97

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE-XQDS~~

June 23, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 299

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Cooperation with France

The President has directed that discussions with the Government of France concerning nuclear safety cooperation (currently being conducted under NSDM 104) be expanded to include assistance in the area of underground testing. The purpose of this expanded program is to provide assistance for French efforts to increase nuclear safety in underground testing and to encourage the French to refrain from further atmospheric testing through the adoption of an underground testing program for all of its nuclear explosives tests. In implementing this expanded program, technical information on instrumentation, containment, and other pertinent technology which will serve to improve the efficacy of the French underground test program may be exchanged. The President has authorized disclosure of unclassified information and classified information through Secret, but not including Restricted Data, for this purpose.

Discussions with the French Government concerning nuclear safety in other areas may be continued within the limits provided in NSDM 104. The President has decided that no French nuclear explosive devices of any type may be accepted for test by the US.

In specific implementation of this decision, the President directs that:

1. The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, inform the French Government of our willingness to expand the current nuclear safety cooperation program as generally described above.
2. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Secretary of State, develop a specific program of cooperation for nuclear safety and underground testing assistance, including

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE-XQDS~~ (BT) (3)

Classified By the Authority of Henry A. Kissinger


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Authority NSC Letter 4/16/96

By LS NLF Date 4/7/97

consideration of any constraints which might be placed on such cooperation by our obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Atomic Energy Act.

3. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration, inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of our extension of the current program and that no exchange of Restricted Data will be involved.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS (3)

July 16, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 300

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1976
and FY 1977

I approve the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1976 and FY 1977 contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated April 16, 1975, with the exception that deployment authorizations for [REDACTED] should remain at the current level until further notice.

The FY 1976-1977 authorized deployment levels by region and afloat forces are summarized as follows:

- Western Europe: [REDACTED] weapons
- Atlantic: [REDACTED] weapons
- Pacific: [REDACTED] weapons
- Afloat: [REDACTED] weapons for FY 1976 and [REDACTED] for FY 1977

The numbers of weapons authorized are year-end ceilings, with the exception of deployments for unforeseen crises and conditional deployments which are treated on a separate basis as indicated below. Actual deployments against these authorizations will be controlled by the Secretary of Defense. Any significant changes contemplated in actual overseas deployments, or any significant differences contemplated be-

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS (3)
By Authority of [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Partially Declassified/Released on 2/21/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

Authority: [REDACTED] 11/16/91
By [REDACTED] NLF Date 4/7/93

UNCLASSIFIED

tween actual and authorized deployment levels, should be coordinated between the Department of Defense and the Department of State and submitted for my approval.

I authorize the Secretary of Defense in FY 1976 and FY 1977 to:

- Deploy nuclear weapons outside the United States up to the limits indicated in the plan.
- Manage and alter overseas nuclear weapons stockpile quantities within the authorized limits as may be required by logistical considerations.
- Support non-U.S. forces in accordance with the provisions contained in the plan.

The total deployment authorization for each separate foreign country or afloat forces, and the total authorization by category of weapons for each region or afloat forces, may be exceeded by no more than 10 percent in the event of unforeseen crises unless I approve otherwise.

Conditional deployments may be made in accordance with the provisions in the plan, with the exception that approval of the SACEUR Reserve conditional deployment category will be held in abeyance pending receipt and review of an analysis of its political and military implications (such as the potential effect upon our allies and competing demands upon our strategic lift resources). The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State, should prepare the analysis and submit it to me by September 1, 1975.

I approve retaining excess warheads in the NATO Guidelines Area and including these weapons in the special deployments category established last year.

Permissive Action Link (PAL) devices should continue to be maintained on all weapons deployed to NATO Europe [REDACTED]

I would like the Department of Defense to revise its deployment tables to reflect the decisions on deployment levels in this NSDM, and to submit the revised tables to me by August 1, 1975.

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UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment authorization request for FY 1977 and FY 1978 should be submitted in February 1976 for my approval. The request should include both the plan for weapon deployments and an analysis of the rationale underlying the plan.

Herold R. Ford

cc: The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS (3)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

July 18, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 301

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva, July 2, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on July 2, 1975 in Geneva. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285.

1. At an appropriate time, and in a manner of its choosing, the Delegation should indicate willingness to consider the Soviet proposal to ban the development, testing, and deployment of systems for placing nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction into earth orbit if the provision is broadened to include present and future fractional orbit bombardment systems (FOBS). Prior to discussing treaty language for dealing with this system, alternatives to the Soviet language should be submitted to Washington for approval.
2. With respect to the effective date of the 2,400 aggregate limitation, while it is the US view that both sides should be at this level by October 3, 1977, the US is prepared to consider a reasonable proposal (a few months) from the Soviet side as to what mutually agreed period of time after that date might be required in order to attain that level. The agreed period of time should reflect an expedited program of dismantling and destruction of those strategic delivery vehicles in excess of 2,400.
3. In connection with discussion of the effective date of the 2,400 aggregate limitation, the Delegation should note that the US believes the other obligations in the agreement, which are not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement, should become effective upon entry into force (i.e., exchange of instruments of ratification) of the new agreement.

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Authority NSC Letter 4/16/96
By let NLF Date 9/2/97

4. On the question of impeding verification by national technical means contained in Article XVII of the Joint Draft Text, paragraph 3 should be reworded as follows:

Each Party undertakes not to use any measure or practice, including measures and practices associated with testing and development, which deliberately impedes verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. The parties undertake to avoid measures or practices which result in unintended interference with national technical means of verification of the other party.

5. The following language should be substituted for the current US version of Article XVI of the Joint Draft Text:

"The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic arms, beginning no later than one year following entry into force of this agreement, with the objective of achieving further limitations and reductions of strategic arms at the earliest possible date. The Parties shall also have the objective of concluding negotiations, well in advance of the expiration of this Agreement, on an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to become effective upon such expiration."

6. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the unbracketed portions of the JDT are acceptable to the US Government with the exception of Article VII and paragraph 3 of Article XVII which should be modified as described above. Concerning some issues contained within the bracketed portions of the JDT:

a. Preamble; Either bracketed formulation would be acceptable and resolution of this issue is left to the Delegation.

b. Article II; The phrase "capable of ranges" should be substituted for "with a range" in the US definition of ICBMs, ASBMs, and any subsequent definitions based on range.



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3.

c. Article IV: The term "depth" may be used in place of "length" provided the negotiating record reflects the understanding of both sides that "depth" is defined as the total internal distance from the top to the bottom of an ICBM silo launcher. In connection with discussion of this Article, if the Soviet side continues to reject the US formula set forth in the JDT the Delegation should explore alternative formulae.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS



~~SECRET~~ XGDS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 18, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 302

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations

After considering the views expressed by the Departments of State and Defense concerning proposals for negotiating instructions on a new United States-Panama Canal Treaty, I have decided to modify the negotiating instructions contained in NSDMs 131 and 115 and to supplement them as follows:

-- The negotiators are authorized to propose to the Panamanians that the treaty duration applicable for defense be separated from its application to operation of the Canal. With regard to duration applicable to operation of the Canal, the United States negotiators should seek to obtain the longest possible period, to terminate not earlier than December 31, 1999. With regard to duration applicable to defense of the Canal, they should seek to obtain a minimum of 50 years, but are authorized to recede to no less than 40 years. They should also make efforts to obtain a right in principle for the United States to participate in Canal defense, including a limited military presence in Panama, following the expiration of the treaty period applicable to defense, such participation to be of a nature and under terms to be agreed upon between the parties not less than one year prior to the treaty's expiration. As a fallback, if deemed necessary to achieve the objective of an extended period for Canal defense or other critical negotiating objectives, the Negotiators may offer a reduction of the duration period applicable to Canal operation to a period of not less than 20 years.

-- With regard to Canal expansion, the United States Negotiators should seek to obtain the longest possible period up to the termination of United States responsibility for operation for a

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC List dated 11/1/83

By let NLS Date 4/7/97

United States option to exercise definitive and exclusive rights to expand the Canal's capacity, whether by addition of a third lane of locks or the construction of a sea-level canal. As a fallback, they may seek to obtain -- either in lieu of or in combination with definitive rights -- commitments that: (a) Panama will not permit the construction of a sea level canal in its territory during the period of United States control of the existing Canal unless it has first offered to the United States the option to construct such a canal. That option should be under terms and conditions which would accord to the United States rights relating to operation and defense commensurate with the due protection and enjoyment of a United States investment of that magnitude; (b) no country other than the United States or Panama shall have responsibility for operation and defense of an interoceanic canal in Panama; and (c) the neutrality guarantee applicable to the existing Canal will apply to any new canal built in Panama.

-- With regard to land/water areas, the United States Negotiators should seek to obtain Panama's acceptance of the United States offer of January 18, 1975, modified by the addition of such of the following areas as the Negotiators find necessary in order to further our objectives:

- Cristobal Piers
- Land and Water Areas in Gatun Lake
- Fort Sherman jungle training area south of the 22nd grid
- Coco Solo, Fort Randolph and access to them via Randolph Road
- Portions of the Albrook/Clayton Training Areas

If agreement is not possible on the basis of these offers, the United States Negotiators should request further instructions from the President.



-- With regard to the negotiating process, the United States Negotiators should seek to obtain Panama's agreement that the negotiations will remain confidential so that the Panama Canal issue will not be injected into the domestic political process in the United States in 1976.

-- With regard to the resumption of negotiations, the United States Negotiators should proceed promptly to continue their task.

-- With regard to the creation of a favorable national environment for treaty ratification, the Departments of State and Defense should join in regular consultations with the Congress on the course of treaty negotiations and should initiate an effort to build support for a new treaty with Panama.

Ronald R. Ford

cc:

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chief Negotiator for the Panama Canal Treaty



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

August 20, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 303

To: The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Chairman, US SALT Delegation

Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285 and NSDM 301.

1. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the US is willing to ban the development, testing, and deployment of the following systems:
 - Land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range;
 - Ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 600 km carried on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;
 - Installations for launching ballistic missiles which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor, including territorial seas or inland waters.
2. The Delegation should propose the following definition of a cruise missile:

A cruise missile is any armed, unmanned, self-propelled, guided missile which sustains flight through use of aerodynamic lift over most of its range.
3. The following language should be substituted for the current US version of Article VII of the Joint Draft Text:
 - a. The limitation provided for in Article III of this agreement shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers.

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Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

Authority NSC 6800 4/22/96
By lit NLF Date 4/7/97




b. The parties agree that:

(1) There shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers for heavy ICBMs.

(2) Construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

(3) Operational ICBM and SLBM launchers used for testing or training shall be considered operational launchers.

In discussing the proposed language for Article VII, the Delegation should indicate that it is the US interpretation of Article VII that all operational launchers, wherever located, should be counted in the 2400 aggregate. The Delegation should also state that in the US view an increase of 15% would constitute a "significant increase" within the meaning of paragraph 2a of Article VII and solicit a Soviet response to this statement.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ - UGDS

September 8, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 304

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: Instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the PNE
Negotiations, Moscow, September 5, 1975

The following instructions have been approved for the negotiations on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs) which will resume in Moscow on September 5, 1975. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 297.

1. The Delegation should state that the U.S. prefers a 150 KT limit on all individual excavation PNEs and, in this context, would be willing to accept a one megaton limit on the aggregate yield of all PNE salvos. The Delegation should cite the following factors as contributing to this preference:

(a) There would be no need to distinguish between excavation and contained PNEs;

(b) The necessity for stringent verification provisions for excavation PNEs would be lessened; in particular, there would be no need for a fission yield restriction and its attendant melt sample collection;

(c) The public and international acceptance of both the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the PNE agreement would be enhanced if all individual PNEs were subject to the TTBT yield restriction.

2. For PNE events with yields above 100 KT, observers should be permitted as needed at the discretion of the side verifying the explosion and observers should be permitted for all PNE groups with aggregate yields above 150 KT.

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Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

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Authority DisC. 1000 9/16/96


By let NLF Date 4/17/97



3. To augment verification of individual PNE yields, the Delegation should propose the use of SLIFERS for all PNE groups with aggregate yields above 150 KT.

4. The Delegation should continue to reiterate our position that all PNEs must be fully consistent with existing treaty obligations, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). In addition, it should state that U.S. studies indicate that it does not appear to be possible to carry out major PNE excavation projects without violating the LTBT. In this regard, the Delegation should avoid technical discussions of such matters as differences in interpretation of the LTBT or de minimus radiation standards.

5. The Delegation is authorized at an appropriate time upon approval by Washington to table on an ad referendum basis the draft PNE treaty prepared by the Verification Panel Working Group.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

September 15, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 305

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Agriculture
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Administrator, Agency for
 International Development

SUBJECT: Termination of U. S. Restrictions on Third
 Countries Trading with Cuba

Following the meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States in San Jose which terminated mandatory prohibitions against trade and other contacts with Cuba, the President reviewed U. S. legislation and regulations relating to other countries' contacts with Cuba. He has decided that, in view of the OAS action, the U. S. should take such actions as are necessary to terminate its restrictions on third countries which trade with Cuba. The steps should include the licensing of subsidiaries abroad of U. S. companies to trade with Cuba when it is the policy of the local government to do so and when the goods involved are non-strategic and do not contain a substantial proportion of component parts manufactured in the U. S.; relief from legislation requiring termination of assistance or provision of PL 480 Title I programs to countries permitting their ships or planes to engage in trade with Cuba; and modification of regulations prohibiting bunkering in U. S. ports of ships engaged in Cuba trade.

The Under Secretaries Committee should be responsible for coordination of the implementation of this NSDM. When appropriate, it should make clear that the actions taken are in conjunction with the OAS Resolution rather than our bilateral policies towards Cuba. All actions taken by

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the Under Secretaries Committee under this NSDM should be reported to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~CONFIDENTIAL/CDS~~

September 24, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 306

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
The Executive Director, Council of International
Economic Policy
The Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy

SUBJECT: U.S. -Japan Space Cooperation

The President has reviewed the May 5, 1975, Under Secretaries Committee study of the 1969 U.S. -Japan Space Cooperation Agreement. He approves the recommendations that:

1. The 1969 Agreement should run its course on the following basis:
 - If requested by Japan and by U.S. industry, we would favorably consider for export, as consistent with national security requirements, remaining launcher manufacturing technology up to the level of the Thor Delta which was operational at the time the 1969 Agreement was concluded (the so-called Delta 58). Guidance and re-entry technology would be excluded.
 - We would seek to limit exports of satellite technology to the level of that in orbit in 1969, as consistent with national security requirements. NASA shall develop appropriate technical criteria to provide a basis for a case-by-case review of export requests.
2. Any export requests going beyond the level of technology in orbit in 1969 as defined above would be evaluated on the basis of our general policy on providing space launching and technology assistance to other countries or would become the subject of a new agreement. Minor requests would be processed through normal export licensing procedures. Restrictions would continue to be imposed on the transfer of hardware and technology by Japan to third-parties, and we would require that Japan not provide launch services to third-parties without our approval. Any requirement for recoupment (for example, of any U.S. investment in the research and development involved) would be determined by the U.S. policy in force at the time a contract was signed.

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Authority NSC 12345-3/14/96

By let NLF Date 4/7/97



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Regarding the requirement for prior approval of launchings for third parties, the President has requested that the Department of State and NASA develop a suitable approach to convey this decision in such a manner as to minimize any adverse reaction on Japan's part.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ 1 XGDS

September 25, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 307-

TO:

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The U. S. Commissioner, Standing Consultative
Commission

SUBJECT:

Instructions for U. S. Commissioner, Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), Geneva,
September 22, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Standing Consultative Commission session beginning on September 22, 1975, in Geneva.

Compliance Issues

The U. S. Commissioner should inform the Soviets that we are continuing to review all the compliance issues of concern to both sides. However, the U. S. Commissioner should state that the U. S. position remains unchanged on the compliance issues discussed at the last SCC session and that the U. S. does not plan to make any further statements at this time on the issues we have raised. If the Soviets reopen any compliance issues which were discussed at the last SCC session, the U. S. Commissioner should rebut Soviet arguments on these issues along the lines he used in SCC VI.

The U. S. Commissioner may inform the Soviet side that the U. S. has no additional questions concerning compliance to raise at this time. If the Soviets raise any new compliance questions regarding U. S. activities, the U. S. Commissioner should listen to their concern, request additional clarification if appropriate, and state that the Soviet concern will be promptly reported to the U. S. Government and that a U. S. response will be provided as soon as practicable (the U. S. Commissioner should not engage in any discussion of such Soviet concerns, beyond seeking additional clarification, prior to receipt of additional instructions).


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Authority: NSC 114-1 4/16/96

By: lit Date: 4/7/97



ABM Replacement Procedures

The U. S. Commissioner is authorized to work out, ad referendum to Governments, ABM replacement procedures along the lines recommended in the Verification Panel Working Group paper "Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components", dated September 11, 1975, with the following exceptions:

1. With respect to the issue of "replacement at the precise location", the U. S. Commissioner should make clear in presenting the U. S. position outlined in paragraph 5 on pp 7-8 that it is not necessary to arrive at separate definitions for modernization and for replacement in this context.

2. With respect to the definition of "initiation of construction", the U. S. Commissioner should await a Soviet response to the current U. S. approach rather than continue to seek agreement to this approach. At an appropriate time and in a manner of his choosing, the U. S. Commissioner is authorized to propose the alternative to the current U. S. position outlined in paragraph 9, p. 13.

3. On the issue of when replacement ABM launchers should first count, the U. S. Commissioner should initially maintain the present U. S. position for both above-ground and silo launchers. However, he is authorized to explore alternatives to the present U. S. position on above-ground launchers which more precisely describe events that occur early in the construction process and which could be used as the basis for determining when replacement ABM launchers first count.

4. Concerning the additional dismantling or destruction required for replaced ABM launchers, the U. S. Commissioner should continue to support the U. S. position for above-ground and silo launchers put forth in SCC-VI.

5. On the issue of additional dismantling or destruction required for replaced ABM radars, the U. S. Commissioner should continue to support the U. S. position in SCC-VI for radars whose antennas are built on top of a building or on a supporting framework, and for antennas mounted on prepared radar positions. However, for radars whose antennas are an integral part of a building, the U. S. Commissioner should indicate that the U. S. can modify its position along the lines of paragraph 5b, p. 32.



Actions on "Measures Agreement"

1. Clarification of Article 4. In continuing discussion of this issue, the U. S. Commissioner should respond along the following lines:

a. Continue to maintain the U. S. position authorized in paragraph two of NSDM 290, implementing paragraph 2(d) if necessary.

b. If the Soviets raise the issue of whether Article 4 should apply only to ballistic missile launches, the U. S. Commissioner should suggest that discussion of this issue be deferred to avoid prejudicing discussion of cruise missiles in SALT.

2. Pre-Agreed Messages. In continuing discussion of these messages, the U. S. Commissioner should respond along the following lines:

a. On the issue of whether the use of pre-agreed messages should be mandatory, the U. S. position is that their use should be strongly encouraged, but not mandatory.

b. With regard to whether the pre-agreed messages should state that they constitute initial notification, the word "initial" can be deleted if deemed appropriate by the U. S. Commissioner.

c. The U.S. should maintain its position that Article 2 covers both nuclear detonations which may occur or which have occurred.

d. Discussion of pre-agreed messages on missile launches should be deferred until the issue of clarification of Article 4 has been resolved.

e. The U.S. component should avoid discussion of pre-agreed messages dealing with nuclear incidents involving third countries. If the Soviets raise this issue, the U. S. Commissioner should state that we have no proposal to make on this subject.


f. With regard to the impact of pre-agreed messages on the Direct Communications Link (DCL) organization and procedures, the U. S. position is that no changes are required with respect to the DCL link between each country's terminal, but that each country should review and improve, if necessary, its organization and procedures for implementing pre-agreed messages.

3. Form of Agreement. Agreements on either the pre-agreed messages or clarification of Article 4 should be in the form of an exchange of letters of understanding between SCC Commissioners or, if the Soviets insist, a Statement of Common Understanding initialed or signed by the Commissioners.

Other Instructions

This session should last approximately four weeks. The U. S. Commissioner should place emphasis during this session in trying to reduce the differences in the ABM Replacement Procedures to the key substantive issues and to make as much progress as possible in resolving the differences associated with the Measures Agreement.

The President emphasizes that, because of the sensitivity of the SCC activities, particularly with regard to the compliance issues, every effort must be made to avoid unauthorized disclosures. Distribution of this NSDM should be limited to those with a clear need-to-know.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXCDS~~

September 30, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 308

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration

SUBJECT: FY 1976 Underground Nuclear Test Program (ANVIL)

Subject to the availability of funds, the President has approved the underground nuclear test program for FY 76 in principle and has specifically approved the detailed program proposed for the first half of FY 76 (ANVIL I) as recommended by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXCDS~~ (B) (3)

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 1-1.4.1, 4/10/96

By Let, NLF Date 4/7/97

Sec Kissinger
Gen Secaer

~~SECRET~~ GDS

October 9, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 309

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Decisions on ROK Air Defense Requirements


The President has reviewed the Joint Chiefs of Staff study on the air defense requirements of the Republic of Korea, together with agency comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:

-- Formulation of U. S. policy in regard to the development of Republic of Korea forces to permit them to meet the North Korean threat with only U. S. logistic support should be delayed pending completion of the current National Security Study Memorandum on U. S. Policy on Korea.

-- The Republic of Korea's request to purchase an additional 18 F-4Es and 60 F-5E/Fs is formally approved.

-- The Republic of Korea should be approached as soon as possible to determine its interest in accepting eight of the twelve U. S. Hawk batteries in Korea in the FY 79 time frame.

-- The possibility of arranging sale of the Hawk batteries at a concessional price should be examined.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Authority *SSS 1e Hqs* 4/16/96

By *lit* NLF Date 4/7/97

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20526

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS

October 16, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 310

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: FY 1976-1978 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

EO 12958
1.5
(a)
(e)

I approve the proposed nuclear weapons stockpile plan for FY 1976-1978 submitted on April 2, 1975, as amended by the revisions submitted on July 31, 1975. Specifically, I approve a total adjusted stockpile of [REDACTED] nuclear warheads for the end of FY 1976, [REDACTED] for the end of FY 1977, and [REDACTED] for the end of FY 1978.

The approved nuclear weapons stockpile levels represent authorized ceilings, not to be exceeded except as provided below or otherwise approved by me. The ceilings and specific programs are subject to change due to budgetary actions and policy decisions that affect our future nuclear posture.

For the FY 1976-1978 period, I authorize:

-- The production and retirement of those quantities of nuclear warheads and nuclear warhead parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved stockpiles, as well as the production of additional parts of nuclear weapons necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the Agreement for Cooperation.

-- ERDA, in coordination with DOD, to initiate production of such long lead-time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1979 production of warheads required to support approved DOD forces.

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Classified by [REDACTED] Kissinger

Partially Declassified/Released on 2/15/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council



Authority: NSC Letter: 9/16/96
By: [REDACTED] NIS Date: 4/7/97

UNCLASSIFIED

-- ERDA to produce and transfer to DOD parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special nuclear material, as may be agreed by ERDA and DOD. These parts may be used in nuclear weapons, training programs, research and development, or production.

-- ERDA, in coordination with DOD, to make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads in FY 1976-1978 as may be necessary to reflect changes in ERDA material availabilities, production/retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements; or as necessary to reflect changes as may be required by DOD because of adjustments in military requirements or delivery assets so long as the changes do not exceed ± 10 percent in each year in strategic offensive, strategic defensive, tactical, and fleet anti-submarine/anti-air warfare warhead totals.

-- ERDA to maintain a surplus of three metric tons of reactor products above annual weapon requirements to provide a contingency reserve. The need for this reserve is to be reviewed each year in the annual stockpile plan.

-- DOD to designate as retired and, in coordination with ERDA, to retain custody of nuclear warheads for a period of up to one year from the date the designation is made if necessary to reduce ERDA requirements for weapon storage during periods of high production workload at ERDA assembly facilities.

Any changes which indicate a significant shift in defense policy or ERDA production capabilities will be submitted to me for my approval.

I have noted the FY 1979-1980 stockpile projection submitted with the FY 1976-1978 request. Since the FY 1979-1980 projection is for planning purposes only, I neither approve nor disapprove the stockpile levels or composition for those years. However, the extended projections are useful in developing integrated programs, and I would like you to include an extended planning projection again with next year's stockpile approval request. The submission should note any additional nuclear materials production capabilities required to satisfy the planning projection. If additional capabilities are required in the recommended planning estimate,

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the submission should also provide an alternative planning estimate that can be satisfied with available capabilities.

The FY 1977-1979 stockpile approval request and the planning projection for FY 1980-1981 should be submitted in February 1976.

Gerald R. Ford

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Les. Sowercroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

November 1, 1975


National Security Decision Memorandum 311

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U.S.-Indonesia Consultative Arrangements

The President has decided, based on the recommendations of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, that we will propose to the Government of Indonesia the establishment of a single Joint U.S.-Indonesia Consultative Commission.

The President requests that the Department of State develop a formal proposal in conjunction with the Department of Defense and such other agencies as is deemed appropriate which we can transmit to the Indonesian Government in the near future. The President asks that you complete this proposal by November 17, 1975.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 252 1494; 4/16/96

By let NLF Date 4/21/97

~~SECRET/GDS~~

National Security Decision Memorandum 313

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Establishment of US Sinai Support Mission

The President has reviewed the response to National Security Study Memorandum 230 regarding the establishment of a US Support Mission in the Sinai, pursuant to the US Proposal of September 1, 1975. The President concurs in the first recommendation of the study and has directed that a senior interagency group be established under the auspices of the National Security Council to organize, coordinate and provide overall management for the Mission. The member agencies of the management board will be the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The President also concurs in the third and fourth recommendations of the Study. He has directed that the Mission be headed by a Director, who will receive broad policy guidance and report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He will be assisted by a small staff in Washington, as well as drawing upon the support of the interagency management board. In the field, the major part of the work will be carried out under private contract with the contractors and their personnel responsible to the Mission Director and his designated representatives. In carrying out his functions, the Director shall hold the additional title of Special Representative of the President.

The President wishes the Sinai Support Mission to be established expeditiously, in order to be in position to carry out effectively its assigned tasks once the Basic Agreement has been fully implemented. Addressees should designate a senior representative to serve on the Interagency management board.

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.

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Authority Also in the title 4/16/94

By 2.2 NEP Data 4/16/97

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- 2 -

The President has also directed that there be a comprehensive review of all operations of the Sinai Support Mission one year from the date of this memorandum, with a view to determining the advisability of any changes in the management or organization of the Mission.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET/GDS~~



cfr. Stewart

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

November 26, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 314

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Agriculture
 The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
 The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for United
 Status Security and Overseas Interests

The President has reviewed the interagency response to NSDD 200 and the covering memorandum from the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. He believes that United States leadership is essential to combat population growth, to implement the World Population Plan of Action and to advance United States security and overseas interests. The President endorses the policy recommendations contained in the Executive Summary of the NSSM 200 response, with the following observations and exceptions:

AID Programs

Care must be taken that our AID program efforts are not so diffuse as to have little impact upon those countries contributing the largest growth in population, and where reductions in fertility are most needed for economic and social progress.

Research and Evaluation

An examination should be undertaken of the effectiveness of population control programs in countries at all levels of development, but with

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
KBA (per NSC F81-1357)



emphasis on the LDC's. The examination should include an evaluation of AID program efforts as well as other efforts by national or international groups. The study would attempt to determine the separate effect of the population program, taking account of other economic or social factors which may have also influenced fertility.

Research on broader issues should be undertaken examining the factors affecting change (or lack of change) in the birth rate in different countries.

Funding for Population Programs:

The President desires that a review be undertaken quickly to examine specific recommendations for funding in the population assistance and family planning field for the period after FY 1976. The President wishes a detailed analysis of the recommended funding levels in the NSDM 200 study bearing in mind his desire to advance population goals. This analysis should include performance criteria to assure that any additional funds are utilized in the most effective manner. The appropriate level of funding of multilateral programs which effectively support this objective should be included in this review. The Chairman of the USC is responsible for preparing this analysis which is due 60 days from the date of this NSDM.

The Role of Other Countries:

Emphasis should be given to fostering international cooperation in reducing population growth in pursuing the recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action. It is important to elicit additional contributions from other developed and newly rich countries for bilateral and multilateral programs.

Basic Approach to Developing Countries' Population Programs:

Leaders of key developing countries should be encouraged to support national and multilateral population assistance programs.

The objective of the United States in this field is to work closely with others rather than to seek to impose our views on others. Our efforts should stress the linkage between reduced population growth and the



resultant economic and social gains for the poorest nations. In all these efforts, we should recognize the basic dignity of the individual and his or her right to choose freely family goals and family planning alternatives.

National and World Population Goals:

The President believes that the recommendation contained in paragraph 31(c) of the Executive Summary dealing with the announcement of a United States national goal is outside the scope of NSSM 200. Of course, domestic efforts in this field must continue in order to achieve worldwide recognition that the United States has been successfully practicing the basic recommendations of the World Plan of Action and that the nation's birthrate is below the replacement level of fertility. In order to obtain the support of the United States citizens for our involvement in international population programs, it is important that they recognize that excessive world population growth can affect domestic problems including economic expansion as well as world instability.

Concerning the consideration of World Population Goals in paragraph 31(b), it should be understood that the general goal of achieving global replacement levels of fertility by the year 2000 does not imply interference in the national policies of other countries.

The Under Secretaries Committee, in conjunction with all appropriate agencies of the Executive Branch, may wish to make further recommendations to the President on these subjects.

Coordination of United States Global Population Policy:

Implementation of a United States worldwide population strategy will involve careful coordination. The response to NSSM 200 is a good beginning, but as noted above, there is need for further examination of the mix of United States assistance strategy and its most efficient application.


The President, therefore, assigns to the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, the responsibility to define and develop policy in the population field and to coordinate its implementation beyond the NSSM 200 response.



The Chairman is instructed to submit an initial report within six months from this date on the implementation of this policy, with recommendations for any modifications in our strategy, funding programs, and particularly, the identification of possible deficiencies. Thereafter the Chairman is instructed to submit reports to the President annually.

The Chairman is authorized to request other appropriate bodies and agencies to assist him in this task as required. For the purpose of implementing this NSDM, the Under Secretaries Committee should include, in addition to the addressee members, ex officio representatives of the following agencies:

Council on Environmental Quality
Office of Management and Budget
The President's Science Adviser


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality



8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

UNCLASSIFIED
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

January 31, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 315

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Military Assistance for Israel

The President has reviewed the NSSM 231 response and the options for military assistance for Israel which were discussed at the National Security Council meeting of January 13, 1976.

The President has decided, in response to Israel's revised request for military equipment from the United States, which was submitted to the Department of Defense on January 8, 1976, that the United States Government should approve the placement of orders by Israel under FMS and commercial procedures for military equipment of a value not exceeding a total of about \$2.0 billion, as indicated by the list attached at Tab A. The Government of Israel will be permitted to request revisions in the list, particularly with respect to quantities of specific items, provided the revisions are consistent with the overall value and types of equipment on the list.

The President has also made a determination with respect to Israeli requests for certain weapons and equipment of an advanced, sophisticated or politically sensitive nature, as indicated in the list at Tab B.

A Middle East Arms Transfer Panel, composed of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the NSC Staff and chaired by the representative of the Department of Defense, will be constituted within the National Security Council system to control the transfer of arms and equipment under FMS and commercial procedures to Israel and such other countries of the Midcast as may be designated.

The President has also directed that Israeli requests for production and delivery of items contained on the list at Tab A, or any subsequent revision, should be handled in accordance with the standard procedures

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

Partially Declassified/Released on 4/29/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

Authority: NSC 12365, 4/16/96

By UK NLF Date: 4/7/97

of the Department of Defense for sales to foreign countries. Any exceptions to standard procedures for arms transfers or amended requests for high sensitivity items should be referred, through the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel, to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Israel's needs for the acquisition of weapons and military equipment are to be kept under continuous review. An interagency review will be conducted annually, or more frequently if necessary, by the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel for consideration by the Senior Review Group and, if necessary, the NSC, prior to the OMB submission of budget review materials to the President for the following fiscal year. In preparation for each annual review:

The Director of Central Intelligence will prepare an overall assessment of the Middle East military balance and situation projected over a period of five years. This assessment should include an estimate of both the most likely and the worst-case threats to Israel.

The Department of Defense will prepare an analysis of current Israeli arms requests and future plans for weapons procurement, including the impact of these requests and plans on future fund requirements, on U.S. inventories and procurement and on commitments to other nations for arms transfers, and the early identification of sensitive technology.

The Department of State will assess Israeli requests for military arms, equipment, supplies and technology, and the impact which providing such items would have on the Middle East and world political situation.

The Office of Management and Budget will prepare an assessment of the funding implications of the Israeli requests.

With regard to Israel's desire to conclude an agreed logistic plan for emergency resupply of military equipment and supplies in the event of resumed hostilities in the Middle East, the President has authorized the Department of Defense to continue preliminary talks with the Israeli Ministry of Defense to elicit and to evaluate specific Israeli views, and to make appropriate recommendations, through the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the President.



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The President has approved the continuation of cooperation between Israel and the United States regarding military co-production, research and development, and technology transfer, under existing Department of Defense procedures and the examination of requests on a case-by-case basis, under the general guidance of the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS
UNCLASSIFIED



Gen Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS

February 4, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 316

To: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDMs 286, 301, and 303.

1. The Delegation should continue to take the position that the U. S. is willing to agree to a resolution of the silo dimension and heavy ICBM definition issues along the following lines:

-- The original volume of ICBM silo launchers cannot be increased by more than 32 percent. In this case, there will no longer be a need to specify separate limitations on increases in either the depth or diameter of silo launchers.

-- A heavy ICBM will be defined as any ICBM having either a throw weight or a launching weight greater than that of the largest non-heavy ICBM deployed on either side on the date of signature of the agreement.

-- The U. S. considers that these two issues have been agreed in principle.

2. The Delegation should modify the U. S. proposal for a ceiling on heavy ICBMs contained in Article IV, Paragraph 7, by replacing "volume or throw weight" with "launching weight or throw weight" and inform the Soviets that the U. S. considers it essential that agreement be reached on such a ceiling.

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Classified by Brent Scowcroft

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Authority NSA 1646; 4/16/96


By lit NLF Date 4/7/99

3. The Delegation should propose a definition for the term "throw weight" along the following lines:

The throw weight of a ballistic missile is the sum of the weight of: (1) its reentry vehicles, (2) its penetration aids, and (3) any buses or other devices it has for propulsion, guidance, control, or release which can cause multiple reentry vehicles or penetration aids to reenter the atmosphere at different locations or times.

4. The U. S. Delegation should seek an explicit agreement on the numerical upper limits on the throw weight and launching weight of non-heavy and heavy ICBMs. However, prior to making precise proposals the Delegation should submit for Washington approval a recommended approach on this issue.

5. The U. S. Delegation should bear in mind that the negotiating history has been that the U. S. has cited the SS-19 as the non-heavy ICBM currently possessing the largest throw weight.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT

February 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECIPIENTS OF EPDM 3/NSDM 317

Attached is a dated copy of EPDM 3/NSDM 317 to replace
the undated copy you received on February 24.

JWD
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 3
National Security Decision Memorandum 317

To: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury

Subject: U. S. Participation in the Third
International Coffee Agreement

The President has reviewed a memorandum on U.S. participation in the Third International Coffee Agreement and has approved the recommendation that the United States sign the Third International Coffee Agreement and seek Senate ratification for the life of the Agreement but that implementing legislation should only be requested through 1979.

The President also approved quick announcement of our intention to join and that the announcement should stress the following points:

- o We believe this Agreement fairly serves the interests of producers and consumers.
- o The Agreement contains no specific price objectives, and will not operate in such a way as to sustain coffee prices above long-term market trends.
- o We will seek implementing legislation for only 3 years, and the U.S. will thus have an opportunity to review the long-term impact of the Agreement on coffee prices before committing itself for the additional 3 years.
- o The Agreement will begin with quotas suspended, assuring that during the current shortage period the Agreement will not work to maintain high prices.
- o Once quotas do come into effect, they will automatically be suspended in the event of future periods of shortage and high prices.
- o The Agreement will encourage producers to replant damaged trees and remove available coffee to the market, thereby increasing supply.

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
Authority AD51 1/14/96

By LUT NLF Date 8/7/97

o It should be made clear that current high coffee prices are the result of a major frost in Brazil last July that destroyed 70 percent of this year's crop.

The Secretary of State is hereby requested to undertake the necessary arrangements to announce this decision in accordance with the above.


Brent Scowcroft


L. William Seidman

CONFIDENTIAL



Gen. Sec. 011000

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXCISE~~

February 25, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 318

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Interior
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Secretary of Transportation
 The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 Director of National Science Foundation
 Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy for Antarctica

The President has reviewed the memorandum forwarded by the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on November 29, 1975, which deals with funding levels and management arrangements for the U.S. Antarctic Program.

The President reaffirms the importance of maintaining an active and influential United States presence in the Antarctic. Under present budget constraints, the President has decided that the level of U.S. activity should be maintained at least at the present level. This is generally described in the report as Level III.

The President reaffirms NSDM 71, in particular the requirements that the National Science Foundation:

1. Budget for and manage the entire United States national program in Antarctica, including the funding of logistic support activities so that the program may be managed as a single package.
2. Continue to fund university research and federal agency programs related to Antarctica;
3. Draw upon logistic support capabilities of government agencies on a cost reimbursable basis; and


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Lef 2/25/76.



4. With approval of the Antarctic Policy Group, use commercial support and management facilities, in lieu of logistic support from government agencies, where these are determined by the National Science Foundation to be cost effective, and by the Antarctic Policy Group not to be detrimental to the national interest.

The President notes that United States national interests in Antarctic go well beyond the normal range of responsibilities of the National Science Foundation and directs that NSF funding for the U.S. Antarctic Program should not be at the expense of other NSF programs. The funds made available to NSF for the Antarctic are not to be utilized for other purposes.

The President agrees that the use of logistic support by the Department of Defense -- assisted by the Coast Guard -- gives the U.S. an important flexibility and reach to operate in that area. The DOD and DOT are to maintain the capability to provide the logistic support requested by the National Science Foundation, and are to develop in collaboration with the Foundation, the logistic arrangements and cost structure required to ensure effective and responsive program support at minimum cost.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee

Scrowcroft
D. H. [unclear]
John S. [unclear]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS

March 2, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 319

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Administrator, Energy Research and
 Development Administration

SUBJECT: Underground Nuclear Test Program for the
 Second Half of FY 1976 and the Transition
 Quarter (ANVIL II)

Subject to the availability of funds, the President has approved the detailed underground nuclear test program for the second half of FY 76 and the transition quarter (ANVIL II), as recommended by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. He has also approved in principle the testing policy set forth in the February 9, 1976 memorandum of the Under Secretaries Committee. However, in view of the importance of ensuring compliance with our treaty commitments, this policy should be supplemented in the next semi-annual review by submission to the President of procedures for the conduct of future tests beyond ANVIL II of nuclear devices with design yields of 150 kt. These guidelines are to include recommended measures to reduce the probability of yields in excess of the Threshold Test Ban treaty, should this treaty come into force.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

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DECLASSIFIED

Approved by ABC 11111, 4/13/98

By lit REF Date 5/14/98



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/XCDS~~

March 4, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 320

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Interior
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

SUBJECT: Instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the New York
 Session of the Third United Nations Conference on
 the Law of the Sea

The President has reviewed the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee's memorandum of February 13, 1976, concerning instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the New York session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

In light of growing pressures in the United States and in a number of foreign countries to move unilaterally on several important issues under consideration in the Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference, the President underscores the importance attached to gaining broad international acceptance during negotiations in 1976 of U.S. oceans policy positions on national security issues, marine resources, scientific research, marine pollution, the regime for the deep seabed, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

The President concurs in the recommendation of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee that NSDMs 260 and 288 continue to serve as the basic instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the UN Law of the Sea Conference.

The President reaffirms the importance attached to gaining international acceptance of law of the sea provisions accommodating U.S. interests on freedom of navigation; unimpeded transit through, under and over inter-

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at 2/3/76




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national straits; and archipelagoes and other reasonable uses of the high seas. Subject to the consent of the senior Department of Defense representatives on the Delegation, the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation is authorized to exercise existing authority on these national security issues.

Recognizing the evolving nature of the negotiations in the LOS Conference on issues relating to the regime for the deep seabed and its resources, the President requests the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to submit any requests for proposed new instructions or revisions to current instructions on this issue via the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee for consideration. In this context, the President has assigned responsibility to the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee for backstopping the UN negotiations on the law of the sea.

The Chairman of the U.S. Delegation is requested to submit a report on the results of the negotiations via the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, to the President, upon completion of the March-May 1976 session of the Law of the Sea Conference.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, National Science Foundation

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SCOWROFT
SD - File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CONFIDENTIAL

April 20, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 324

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director, Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 The Administrator, Energy Research
 and Development Administration

SUBJECT: Negotiation of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

The President has reviewed the report of Dr. Seaman and the recommendations of the addressees regarding our nuclear negotiations with Iran and has approved the following negotiating position for the forthcoming talks convening on April 20 with the Iranian representative. The U.S. side should:

-- Seek a strong political commitment from Iran to pursue the multinational/binational reprocessing plant concept, according to the U.S. the opportunity to participate in the project. In addition to citing the economic rationale for such a facility, the U.S. side should underscore the potential role of the facility in serving mutual U.S. - GOI non-proliferation in the region by offering Pakistan the possibility of participation in a multinational plant as an alternative to a national reprocessing facility.

-- Seek a commitment from Iran to consult closely with us on its prospective reprocessing plans before making any firm decision whether multinational or otherwise. The U.S. side should offer to help Iran assess, in detail, the economic viability of proceeding with any reprocessing venture and the modalities of possible multinational configurations.

-- In the event Iran agrees to make efforts to establish a multinational plant and is unsuccessful, the U.S. should have the option to recover the plutonium produced in US-supplied reactors or from US-supplied fuel either on the basis of buy-back or a fuel exchange.

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CONFIDENTIAL/SDS

Authority: NSC Memo, 2/10/98


By lit NLF Date 3/13/98



Were the U.S. not to exercise this option, we would be prepared to consent to reprocessing in an Iranian plant subject to: (a) the continuing requirement that we be satisfied that the IAEA safeguards applied to the facilities are effective; and (b) Iranian agreement that the U.S. could supplement these IAEA safeguards through the assignment of U.S. technical personnel, if necessary. Should it prove essential, in the view of the negotiators, to the achievement of an ad referendum agreement, they are authorized to withdraw the plutonium buy-back option.

-- Seek (1) to maintain the integrity of the text of the basic draft Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, which includes a provision requiring mutual consent for the reprocessing, storage, and fabrication of plutonium derived from U.S. fuel or reactors, and (2) to provide Iran in an accompanying note a statement of the conditions, as outlined above, under which U.S. consent would be granted. If Iran objects strongly to this arrangement, the U.S. side should, in return for a clear high-level commitment from Iran to pursue the binational/multinational concept, agree to incorporate the statement of the conditions of consent in the body of the agreement.

If an ad referendum agreement is reached, key members of Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should be consulted to judge the acceptability of the agreement.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ (XGDS)

April 20, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 325

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Interior
 The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Svalbard

The President has considered the response to NSSM 232 on US policy toward Svalbard/Spitbergen submitted by the Acting Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on April 7, 1976, together with the recommendations relating thereto.

The President has decided that United States objectives with respect to Svalbard are to prevent Soviet encroachments in a region which is part of the NATO area and to protect commercial and scientific rights in the Svalbard area accruing to the United States as a signatory to the 1920 Treaty. The President directs that, in consultations with Norway and other signatories to the Spitzbergen Treaty concerning Norwegian-Soviet negotiations on their Barents Sea boundary dispute and the broader question of the status of the Svalbard shelf, the following guidelines should shape the US position:

-- The United States should counsel firmness in defense of Norway's legitimate rights and should provide diplomatic support to Norwegian efforts to assert more vigorously its sovereignty on Svalbard through expressions of support and encouragement to the Norwegians, encouragement of support for Norway by our allies and other Treaty signatories, and demarches to the USSR. Demarches to the USSR should draw on US-Soviet mutual interest in relaxing tensions and maintaining stability in the northern area and should include assurances that Norway seeks carefully delimited objectives without constraint on legitimate Soviet prerogatives.

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Authority NIS memo, 3/10/98

By WT NIS Date 3/13/98



-- The United States should seek to protect its economic and strategic interests on the continental shelf and those of its allies through guarantees by Norway in the context of full acceptance of Norway's sovereignty rights over the shelf rather than through extension of Spitsbergen Treaty rights. The United States reservation of rights under the Treaty to exploration and exploitation of mineral resources of the continental shelf should be maintained while eliciting Norwegian views and plans for a regulatory regime to guide exploitation of hydrocarbon resources under the waters of the Svalbard region.

The President has directed that the following specific steps be taken to implement the above policy guidelines:

-- The Department of State should inform the Norwegian Government of US views and policy toward Svalbard, consulting with the Department of Defense on related security matters including US law of the sea interests and demilitarization of Svalbard.

-- The United States should urge Norway to continue to reject Soviet attempts to use the sector line approach to resolve their continental shelf boundary dispute.

-- Discussions with the allies, the USSR and others in support of Norwegian assertions of sovereignty on Svalbard and with regard to the status of the Svalbard continental shelf should be undertaken by the Department of State.

-- The Director of Central Intelligence should prepare an intelligence survey of present Soviet dispositions and activities in the Svalbard region to provide a base-line against which to measure future Soviet activity.

-- The Department of State and the Federal Energy Administration should prepare a preliminary study of possible regulatory regimes that might be applied to exploration and exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources in the waters of the Svalbard region under various types of jurisdiction.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

April 21, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 326

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Functions and Organizations of National
 Security Council Sub-Groups

I have reviewed the organization and functions of the various sub-groups of the National Security Council and have made the following determinations:

The functions of the Senior Review Group will remain as described in the second and third paragraphs of National Security Decision Memorandum 85. It will continue to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership will include:

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

KBH 1245/96
(per NSC)



The Verification Panel will continue to perform the basic technical analysis to help develop choices and proposals for strategic arms limitation, approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, and other major arms control subjects. This analysis will include the verification requirements which must accompany arms limitations and the capabilities of weapons systems whose limitation is being considered. It will be chaired by the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will include:

- The Deputy Secretary of State
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Those portions of the Memorandum of July 21, 1969, signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and of National Security Study Memoranda 92 and 128 which relate to the organization or functions of the Verification Panel are superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

The Defense Program Review Committee, established by National Security Council Memorandum 26, shall be reconstituted as the Defense Review Panel. The Panel will review major defense policy and program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic and economic implications in relation to overall national priorities. The Defense Review Panel will be chaired by the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will include:

- The Deputy Secretary of State
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Office of Management and Budget *
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[*For consideration of matters having budgetary implications.]

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

National Security Decision Memorandum 26 is hereby superseded by this Decision Memorandum.



The Washington Special Actions Group will continue to develop options for implementation of decisions during crises and for integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action. It will be chaired by the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will consist of:

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

That portion of the Memorandum of May 16, 1969, signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which relates to the organization and functions of the Group is superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

The 40 Committee, is hereby abolished. It is replaced by the Operations Advisory Group, established by Executive Order 11905 of February 18, 1976.

This group will review and advise the President on covert operations and certain sensitive foreign intelligence collection missions. It will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership will be as follows:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Observers:

The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Intelligence Committee, established by the President's Memorandum of November 5, 1971, is hereby abolished.

The Committee on Foreign Intelligence was established by Executive Order 11905 and its duties are as described in the Executive Order.



It is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and its membership consists of:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The functions and membership of the Under Secretaries Committee will remain as described in National Security Decision Memoranda 2 and 8. It will be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State.

The functions and membership of the six standing Interdepartmental Groups will remain as described in National Security Decision Memorandum 2. The five geographic Groups will be chaired by the appropriate geographic Assistant Secretary of State. The Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs will be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense.

Harold R. Felt



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April 21, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 327

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Thailand

The President has reviewed the inter-agency study on Thailand in response to NSSM 225. Having reviewed the options which the study proposes, the President has decided that the following will constitute our future policy toward Thailand. We will:

- Continue a security assistance program whose grant MAP component will decline from the FY 75 level.
- Not hinder the Thai in their efforts to adjust to new relationships with their Communist and non-Communist neighbors, and with us.
- Focus our bilateral economic aid program on problems of the poorer rural areas.
- Seek to improve U.S.-Thai trade and access for U.S. businessmen and investors in the Thai market through the following:
 - o Point out to the Thai those steps necessary to create a favorable investment climate.
 - o Insist on a genuinely reciprocal aviation agreement, and not attempt to compensate the Thai for their own failure to exploit fully their aviation rights and opportunities.
 - o Continue to advise the Thai of our stockpile disposals and of our PL-480 sales in traditional Thai markets.

SECRET (GDS)

Classified by Drent Scowcroft
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Authority NSC 6401 4/17/98

By 64 DATE 5/4/98

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-- Support anti-narcotics activities in Thailand through the following:

- o Gather intelligence to the fullest extent possible on narcotics trafficking in Thailand.

- o Work with the Thai to reduce the amount of illicit opium produced in Thailand.

- o Cooperate with the Thai in suppressing narcotics traffic in and through Thailand.

-- Continue to conduct information, cultural, and Peace Corps programs designed to demonstrate that good relations with the United States are advantageous to Thailand.

-- Reduce the size and tighten up the organization of our official presence to make it more in tune with our reduced activities in Thailand.

This NSDM supplements earlier Presidential decisions made regarding retention of U.S. military facilities in Thailand.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET (CDS)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET (CDS)~~

May 6, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 330

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Acting Executive Director,
Council on International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: United States Policy on Export-Import
Bank Loans for South Africa

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 236, and has approved the recommendation that there be no change in Export-Import Bank policy on loans to South Africa.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Export-Import Bank

~~SECRET (CDS)~~

Let 2/2/98

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505~~SECRET~~ CDS

June 11, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 331

To: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks, Geneva,
June 1, 1976

The following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks beginning on June 1, 1976, in Geneva have been approved.

1. The Delegation should maintain the current U.S. JDT language referring to "bombers" to describe those aircraft which carry ASBMs.
2. The Delegation should maintain the position that the classification of future aircraft as heavy bombers should be determined through consultations on a case-by-case basis.
3. With respect to heavy bomber variants, the Delegation should request that the Soviets provide technical information which would support their contention that the Bear and Bison heavy bombers are readily distinguishable from the tanker, ASW, and reconnaissance variants of these aircraft and that conversion of these variants to heavy bombers would require a substantial period of time.
4. The Delegation should not raise the issue of a minimum range for those SLBMs whose launchers are to be covered by the agreement.
5. The Delegation should maintain the position that "throw weight" should be defined so as to include single-RV post boost vehicles.


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Authority NSC Letter 4/13/98

By 114 NLF Date 5/4/98

6. The Delegation is authorized to accept the term "light" to describe those ICBMs which do not satisfy the heavy ICBM definition, but such acceptance is conditioned on a satisfactory resolution of throw weight definition and heavy ICBM ceiling issues along the lines proposed by the U.S. The Delegation should also insert into the record a clear statement to the effect that the U.S. does not consider all "light" missiles as comparable. Thus, at some later point, we may return to the question of missile classifications.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1976


Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 16
National Security Decision Memorandum 334


TO: The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Questionable Payments Legislation

The President has reviewed the memorandum on questionable payments legislation and approved submitting Administration legislation seeking reporting and limited disclosure of corporate payments abroad with discretionary safeguards in relation to interests of foreign policy and the judicial process. Such reports would be submitted to the Department of Commerce and would be made available immediately to the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Internal Revenue Service, and to the Securities and Exchange Commission if the filer is subject to SEC jurisdiction. Reports would be kept confidential in accord with Section 1905 of Title 18, U.S. Code, for one year, after which they would be made available for public inspection unless, in a given case, a specific determination were made by the Secretary of State that foreign policy interests dictated against public disclosure, or a specific determination were made by the Attorney General that the status of an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution dictated against public disclosure through other than conventional judicial processes.

You are hereby requested to promptly submit legislation in accordance with the above decision.


Brent Scowcroft


L. William Seidman

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations



Handwritten signatures and initials

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET

August 14, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 336

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

SUBJECT: Instructions for the August-September 1976
Session of the Third United Nations Conference
on Law of the Sea

The President has reviewed the July 30, 1976 memorandum from the Acting Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee concerning instructions for the U. S. Delegation to the August-September session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, together with the accompanying agency comments.

The President reiterates the importance of gaining broad international acceptance during the negotiations in 1976 of U.S. oceans policy positions on freedom of the high seas, unimpeded passage through and over international straits and archipelagos, access to seabed minerals, freedom of scientific research, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Subject to the consent of the senior Department of Defense representative on the Delegation, the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation is authorized to exercise existing authority on national security issues in the negotiations.

In this context, the President reaffirms the existing negotiating instructions as prescribed in NSDMs 260, 288, and 320 and concurs with the view of the Acting Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee that there is no need for change to existing instructions.

Should the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation deem it necessary to seek additional negotiating instructions during the August-September 1976 session, such requests should be forwarded for the President's consideration via the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, who will continue to be responsible for backstopping the U. S. Law of the Sea negotiations.

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
By WJ NLF Date 5/11/98



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Upon conclusion of the August-September 1976 session, the Chairman of the U. S. Delegation is requested to submit a report to the President via the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee on the results of the negotiations.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

SECRET (XGDS) (3)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET XGDS

August 23, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 337

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT: Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile

The President has reviewed the results of the NSSM 228 study on the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile, and has decided that the quantitative levels and materials composition of stockpile inventories shall be based upon the following criteria:

1. The stockpile should provide a hedge against military and civilian production shortfalls resulting from disruption of foreign supplies of certain strategic and critical materials during wartime. The stockpile should provide materials for a level of potential military conflict greater than that postulated by U.S. force structure planning, to provide protection against the possibility of larger or more protracted wars.
2. Significant austerity measures will be taken as necessary within the national economy to sustain defense production. Within these conditions of wartime austerity, the stockpile should provide for certain civilian economic requirements necessary to ensure timely mobilization and overall strength of the wartime economy.

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(Classified by Brent Scowcroft)

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Authority NIS Ltr 4/12/95

By let NLF Date 5/4/98

3. Determination of specific materials requirements should:
 - a. Provide the materials necessary to support expanded U.S. military forces engaged in a major two-front war, or in a one-front war with redeployment of other forces to that front;
 - b. Provide the materials needed for those forces at mobilization levels, replacement levels, and resupply levels equivalent to the first three years of such a war;
 - c. Include provision for those aspects of the civilian economy central to the continued effectiveness of wartime industrial production and related non-military needs (Essential and General Civilian requirements); and
 - d. Assume that industrial and military mobilization commence one year prior to the beginning of hostilities.

Specific acquisitions and disposals to meet these requirements should:

1. Reflect Department of Defense determinations as to specific materials required for military force expansion and replenishment in wartime;
2. Be scheduled so as to accord priority generally to Defense requirements, then Essential and General Civilian requirements;
3. Be submitted annually through an Annual Materials Plan, to be formulated by an interagency group which will consider, as a minimum, materials goals, fiscal constraints, and market impact in structuring specific acquisition and disposal proposals; and
4. In all cases be implemented to the extent practicable without avoidable disruption of the market.



The Administrator, General Services Administration, shall adjust the stockpile inventory requirements to reflect the revised guidelines outlined here, and shall implement a Stockpile Planning Process which includes timely updating of data on materials requirements, supplies, costs, reliability of foreign supply, and other factors relevant to the Stockpile Planning Process. The Administrator shall also advise the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on a semiannual basis as to changes in these data which affect significantly the implementation of U. S. Strategic Stockpile Policy.

William G. McGowan

Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Council on International
Economic Policy



SECRET XGDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CONFIDENTIAL

November 4, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 340

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. Port Security Program

The President has approved the following statement of policy on U.S. port security, which supersedes National Security Decision Memorandum No. 82 dated September 1, 1970, and previous issuances of national security policy statements on this subject.

I. U.S. Port Security Policy

1. National security interests require that measures be taken for the protection of vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities of the United States from threats of espionage, sabotage, intelligence collection operations directed against sensitive U.S. defense facilities from foreign vessels, and related subversive activities including the introduction into the United States of persons or materials in the pursuance of such activities. It is also in our national interest that entries of vessels of certain nations, as specified below, into U.S. ports be permitted only in reciprocity for the admission of U.S. vessels to ports of those countries or in reciprocity for other considerations.

2. With a view to fulfilling these national requirements, the Secretary of Transportation is hereby assigned the responsibility for the promulgation -- in consultation with the Secretary of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence -- of a U.S. port security program to meet the objectives listed below.

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XGDS (3)



XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority
of Exec. Secretariat; Exemption
Category Section 5(B)(3)
DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC Letter 4/13/98

By lit MFC/m 5/19/98

3. To advise the Secretary of Transportation in the administration of the port security program there is hereby established a Port Security Committee comprised of a chairman, appointed by the Secretary of Transportation, and representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency (as observing member).

II. Objectives

1. The exclusion from U.S. ports of vessels known to be under the effective control of or bearing the flag of North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Cuba and Cambodia unless under force majeure.
2. Requests for entry into U.S. ports by vessels known to be under the effective control of or bearing the flag of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are to be considered on the basis of reciprocity for actions taken by the governments of those countries with respect to requests for admission of U.S. vessels to their ports or reciprocity for other considerations. (In exercising primary responsibility for obtaining an understanding with these governments regarding this requirement, the Department of State shall consult with the Port Security Committee. The U.S. port security measures prescribed in paragraphs 3.b. and 3.c. below are not subject to modification through reciprocal agreement and are, therefore, to be excluded from discussions of understandings reached with other nations on the reciprocity issue.)
3. Application of the following port security measures in the case of requests for entry into the U.S. ports on the part of vessels known to be under the effective control of or bearing the flag of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, or Romania:
 - a. Each such vessel must submit an advance request or notice for entry into a U.S. port and notification as to scheduled time of arrival;
 - b. The Secretary of Transportation -- in consultation with the Port Security Committee -- shall determine the action to be taken with respect to each such vessel seeking admission to a U.S. port, as follows:
 - (1) -- denial of entry if information indicates that the presence of a particular vessel in a U.S. port would constitute an unacceptable risk to the national defense and security; or



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- 3 -

(2) -- depending upon the degree of security threat judged to be present, admission of the vessel subject to surveillance or other restriction or its entry with no restrictions;

(3) -- when a vessel is admitted, timely notification to other U.S. Government departments and agencies having internal security responsibilities and programs associated with the arrivals of such vessels admitted to U.S. ports.

c. Each such vessel shall be boarded and searched by the United States Coast Guard as a condition for entry to a U.S. port.

4. Entry of vessels suspected of being under the effective control of North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Cuba, Cambodia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, or the People's Republic of China may also be subject to the restrictions of II. 3. above.

5. The national categories specified in this NSDM may be updated by the Port Security Committee subject to approval by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.


Brent Scowcroft

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 16, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 342

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Organizations to Perform Security Assistance Functions

The President has reviewed the study of the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs on MAAG Requirements and has noted agency views. The President has decided to establish or continue in the countries indicated the following organizations to perform security assistance functions in Fiscal Year 1978. Personnel and funding levels will be those established in the President's Fiscal Year 1978 budget request.

Defense Field Offices

Ethiopia	Kuwait*	Saudi Arabia*
Greece	Liberia	Spain
Indonesia	Morocco	Thailand
Iran**/**	Pakistan	Tunisia**
Japan	Philippines	Turkey
Jordan	Portugal	Zaire
Korea	Republic of China	

Military Groups

Argentina	Dominican Republic**	Panama
Bolivia	Ecuador**	Paraguay***
Brazil	El Salvador**	Peru**
Chile**	Guatemala	Uruguay***
Colombia	Honduras**	Venezuela
Costa Rica***	Nicaragua	

- * The Defense Field Office will be replaced by an Office of Defense Cooperation if an adequate level of reimbursement can be obtained from the host country.
- ** Six or less members of the U.S. military will be assigned to the Defense Field Office or Military Group.
- *** Three or less members of the U.S. military will be assigned to the Military Group.

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

at 2/3/98



Offices of Defense Cooperation

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Denmark

France

Federal Republic of Germany

India

Italy

Netherlands

Norway

United Kingdom

The Secretary of State, in close cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, should propose legislation which will:

- Authorize establishment of Defense Field Offices in the countries specified above.
- Provide for continued operation of the Latin American military groups based on their traditional role of representation.
- Permit, without specific congressional approval, the assignment to the chief of each U.S. diplomatic mission of up to six military personnel to perform security assistance functions.
- Allow Defense Attache Offices to continue to perform security assistance functions in countries where either manpower and cost savings are effected or political sensitivities are paramount.

If these amendments to the existing law are not forthcoming, Office of Defense Cooperation will be established or Defense Field Offices will be proposed where necessary.


Brent Scowcroft

cc - The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS

December 30, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 343

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration

SUBJECT: FY 1977 Underground Nuclear Test Program (FULCRUM)

The President has approved in principle the underground nuclear test program for FY 1977 and has specifically approved the detailed program proposed for the first half of FY 1977 (FULCRUM I), as recommended by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. He has also approved the supplemental testing procedures and guidelines set forth in the November 29, 1976 memorandum of the Under Secretaries Committee. These procedures and guidelines, which supersede those approved in principle in NSDM 319, are intended to reduce the probability of yields in excess of 150 kt when devices are tested with design yields at or near this limit.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (B)(3)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC Letter 4/13/98

By LLF NLF Date 5/4/98



UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 18, 1977

National Security Decision Memorandum 344

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Navy Shipbuilding Program

The President has reviewed the results of the National Security Council Study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements, and has decided that the United States and its allies must in combination maintain a superiority in maritime capability that can deter or defeat the Soviet threat in a timely manner. The United States must also maintain maritime forces capable of carrying out other U.S. military requirements. The shipbuilding plan which will assure the accomplishment of these goals should:

- Provide for steady growth in active ship force levels to attain and maintain an active force of about 600 ships in the mid-1990s.
- Maintain a balanced force of ships which includes a mix of units with high individual capability and a larger proportion of ships with lower individual capability.
- Proceed at a pace which provides both real growth in funding and industrial capability to maintain existing fleet units at high levels of readiness while the shipbuilding program is being carried out.
- Cancel procurement of the previously requested NIMITZ-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN-71) and proceed as rapidly as practical to construct a new class of V-STOL aircraft carriers.

Accordingly, the President has decided on a shipbuilding plan which is derived from Option 1 in the study, with modifications. The following table shows the approved five-year shipbuilding plan:

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Classified by:
Brent Scowcroft



UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-26-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526
by L. S. [illegible] [illegible]

UNCLASSIFIED

	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>Total</u>
FBM Submarines (Trident)	2	1	2	1	2	8
Attack Submarines (SSN-688)	2	1	1	2	2	8
V/STOL Carrier (CVV)	-	1	-	1	-	2
Carrier SLEP*	-	-	(1)	-	(1)	(2)
Strike Cruisers (CSGN)	-	1	-	-	1	2
AEGIS Destroyers (DDG-47)	1	-	3	3	3	10
Frigates (FFG)	11	11	12	13	11	58
Mine Warfare	-	1	6	6	6	19
Amphibious (LSD-41)	-	1	-	2	3	6
Support	9	12	12	8	3	44
Support Conversion	<u>(1)</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>(1)</u>
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION	25	29	36	36	31	157
CONVERSION	(1)		(1)		(1)	(3)

 * Service Life Extension Program

Brent Scowcroft
 Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Secretary of State
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget

~~SECRET~~ GDS

UNCLASSIFIED



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

UNCLASSIFIED
(S) (FROTH) (2005)

January 20, 1977

National Security Decision Memorandum 347

TO: Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: The Classification of Sensitive Nuclear Safeguards
Information

The President has reviewed the interagency study conducted pursuant to National Security Study Memorandum 216 and has determined that, owing to the potential consequences of loss or diversion of significant quantities of strategic nuclear material (plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 enriched above 20%), or sabotage of any facility or activity involving such material, unauthorized disclosure by any person of certain information relating to the protection of such material, facilities or activities could reasonably be expected to cause some degree of damage to the national security. Consequently, the following information should be classified, when appropriate, under Executive Order 11652 and implementing directives of that order:

- Information concerning measures for the physical protection of significant quantities of strategic nuclear material by whomever possessed at fixed sites or in transit or for the physical protection of nuclear facilities (i. e., production or utilization facilities or any other facilities or activities) involving such material if the disclosure of such information may be reasonably expected to facilitate theft, diversion or sabotage.
- Information concerning control and accounting procedures for significant quantities of strategic nuclear material, including but not limited to inventory discrepancy data generated under such procedures. This information shall remain classified for at least a period of six months after it is generated, or any longer period of active ongoing investigation. At the expiration of six months or the conclusion of a related investigation, whichever is later, such data classified on the basis solely of this directive may be declassified.

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified on 2/29/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by O. Van Tassel, National Security Council
F96-98


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UNCLASSIFIED

2

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration shall each prescribe such regulations or orders additional to those already issued as they may deem necessary to implement fully the above classification directives. All such regulations should be carefully tailored so as to be as consistent as practicable and to apply the minimum restrictions needed to achieve safeguards objectives.

The decision as to the applicability of the foregoing directive to physical security plans of licensed, privately-owned nuclear reactors is deferred until completion of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Use of Mixed Oxide Fuels.

This directive is not intended to preclude classification pursuant to E. O. 11652, of any nuclear safeguards information otherwise requiring protection in the interest of national security.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XCDS~~

January 20, 1977

National Security Decision Memorandum 348

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U. S. Defense Policy and Military Posture

I have completed my review of the NSSM 246 report on U. S. Defense Policy and Military Posture and have reached the following conclusions with respect to the policies and strategies which are necessary to preserve our security.

To ensure the credibility and strength of our military deterrent across the full spectrum of potential conflict, our overriding aims must be to maintain:

-- A strategic balance with the Soviet Union that guarantees the United States will never be in an inferior position.

-- An adequate American contribution to the defense of the NATO area.

-- A global capability designed to meet those challenges outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact area that threaten vital U. S. interests.

1. Strategic Forces

To be credible to the Soviets, the U. S. strategic deterrent must be adequate both for a massive retaliatory strike against any Soviet attack as well as capable of launching varied effective responses to less-than-all-out Soviet first strike. A range of credible options is thus critical to maintaining deterrence, as well as to escalation control, satisfactory war termination, and postwar recovery. Therefore, the nuclear employment policy directed by NSDM 242 is reaffirmed, as amplified below.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XCDS (3) (3)~~

Classified by Brent Scowcroft

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified, Released on 22698
under provisions of E.O. 12853
of L. Security National Security Council
F97-157

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XCDS

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U. S. strategic nuclear force planning should be guided by the following general principles:

-- The United States must continue to maintain a Triad composed of land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. Specific programs to modernize each of the Triad elements are indispensable in light of the projected military balance in the next decade. A modernized Triad will constitute our principal strategic deterrent for the foreseeable future. It will continue to provide the force diversity necessary to assure that U. S. strategic forces can perform as required across the full spectrum of possible conflict, complicate any Soviet plan for disarming attack, and hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs or catastrophic failures.

-- Our strategic nuclear forces should be capable of meeting targeting requirements against political, economic, and military targets related to postwar recovery; permit flexible response options; and provide a strategic reserve.

-- Our strategic nuclear forces should also be capable of denying Soviet military advantages by providing an unqualified assurance of a second strike against Soviet strategic and peripheral nuclear attack forces and other military targets, after a Soviet first strike against U. S. strategic forces. In particular, the United States should move toward an effective counter-silo capability against residual Soviet ICBMs.

-- Our strategic nuclear forces should not, however, in fact or appearance be such as to persuade the Soviets that we have, or are seeking, a disarming first strike capability, if we perceive that this is not an objective of Soviet policy.

-- Because stability in times of crisis is critical to deterrence, measures must be developed to assure the future survivability of the U. S. ICBM force.

-- Strengthening of our strategic nuclear force posture to accomplish these objectives can be compatible with the Vladivostok SALT limitations on strategic forces, and should provide a strong incentive to permit negotiated reductions in total numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XCDS

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3

2. General Purpose Forces

The security of Western Europe and the integrity of the NATO alliance must remain a foundation stone of U.S. policy for the foreseeable future. The modernization and growth in capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces which NATO would confront in conflict can be met with appropriate modernization and posture adjustments by the U.S. and its NATO allies without need to fundamentally alter the agreed NATO strategy. The following principles should guide U.S. planning:

-- The responsiveness of U.S. and allied conventional forces to potential attack should be designed to cope with both a short warning time as well as attacks with larger and better prepared forces after lengthier periods of warning. To meet these objectives, increases in U.S. prepositioned equipment and supplies in Europe should be made as warranted.

-- The current program to provide U.S. sustaining capability for 90 days of conflict should be continued. In addition, U.S. allies should be encouraged to increase their own sustaining capabilities to 90 days. Achievement of the complex and long standing NATO objectives of standardization and interoperability of equipment, and capacity for mutual support, may well be the critical ingredients in improving European ability to sustain a conflict. This effort should be encouraged.

-- Pending further assessment as to how the United States might best participate in the collective defense of the flanks, current planning for U.S. capabilities on NATO's flanks should be continued.

-- Planning for European defense should continue to include the aim of achieving a better overall balance through negotiated reductions in the MBFR context.

The United States should continue to maintain a strong theater nuclear capability. Our theater nuclear forces serve as a hedge for theater defense should conventional defense fail; deter Soviet theater nuclear attacks; and provide a linkage to strategic forces, a particularly important element in our NATO posture.

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UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

4

There will be a considerable, and perhaps growing, potential for crises outside of Europe. The United States must have as one of its objectives to strengthen its worldwide capabilities. This calls for careful attention to the planning of U.S. general purpose forces for non-NATO contingencies, focusing on the potential force requirements for a wide variety of possible conflicts, the strategic mobility requirements to move force elements to crisis areas, and the overseas base structure and access rights necessary to support such force commitments.

3. Arms Control

The foregoing guidelines are dictated by national security. It is equally important to our security that we make a genuine effort in arms control negotiations on both the strategic and regional levels, seeking a more stable balance through a series of agreements. Such agreements on an equitable and verifiable basis could provide a reduction in the demand on defense resources, with no diminution in national security, while enhancing overall stability and advancing world peace.

Harold R. Ford

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, Energy Research and Development
Administration

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

UNCLASSIFIED



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/XXGDS~~

August 12, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 207

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Israeli Future Military Requirements

The President has directed a study of the proposals of the Government of Israel included in its paper "The Defense Requirements of the Israeli Defense Forces for the Next Ten Years (1974-1983)," known as "MATMON B." The purpose of the study is to review and assess the Israeli plan in the context of its implications for the situation in the Middle East, the peace settlement process, U.S. foreign policy, U.S. military readiness posture including international security interests, and defense production. The study should consider, but not be limited to the following:

Military factors:

- Assessment of the threat as projected by the Israelis, and the rationale and reasons for differences in U.S. and Israeli perceptions of the threat.
- Assessment of the force structure which the Israelis consider necessary to meet the threat.
- Military strategy which the projected Israeli force structure is designed to implement.
- Implications of MATMON for U.S. defense planning, i.e., impact on U.S. defense production as it affects the readiness of U.S. forces and the ability of DOD to meet military assistance and sales commitments to other nations.

Political and economic factors:

- An assessment of the political strategy which the projected Israeli force structure is designed to implement, both in terms of Israeli interests and U.S. interests.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1/28/98
By let NLF Dec 21/98

- the effect of approval of MATMON in whole or in part on the Middle East peace settlement process, possible Soviet reaction, and U.S. long-term interests in the Arab world;
- budgeting and funding requirements to support the MATMON proposal.

Based on the foregoing assessment, the study should present alternative U.S. responses to the MATMON proposal. Each option should include specific implementing actions relevant to the peace-making process, funding and production capabilities, and actions required for obtaining Congressional approval for the necessary multi-year programming and funding. The advantages and disadvantages of each option should be thoroughly assessed.

The study should be prepared by an NSC ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff, and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of Defense. The completed study should be submitted by August 26, 1974 for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.

The study should be conducted on a most close-hold, need-to-know basis.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget



Gen. Secowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

August 12, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 208

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Azores Base Agreement Negotiations

In response to NSSM 189, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee submitted a study on the US-Portuguese Azores base negotiations, under cover of the committee chairman's memorandum of March 21, 1974.

The President has requested that the response to NSSM 189 be revised and updated to take into account:

- the change of government in Portugal;
- the change in Portugal's policy toward its African territories;
- the importance of the Azores facilities to the United States;
- Portugal's request that the negotiations begin as soon as possible with a view to conclusion by October;
- Portugal's request for Azores base compensation in the form of financial, economic and technical assistance, as well as Portugal's desire for military assistance; and
- the importance of Portugal to NATO and the West.

The supplementary response to NSSM 189 should include a recommended U.S. negotiating position, together with a review of Congressional considerations having a bearing on the Azores negotiations. The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, is requested to forward the supplementary response no later than August 30, 1974, for consideration by the President.

[Signature]
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget

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DECLASSIFIED

Activity NSC status list 1/28/98

By *[initials]* NSC 2/4/98



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ XGBS

September 5, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 209

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium
Enrichment Capacity

The President has directed that the issues associated with a shift to private ownership of part of our future uranium enrichment capacity be reexamined. The study should consider but not be limited to the following:

What is the outlook for private sector assumption of the enrichment business with present and prospective technologies?

What are the prospects for adequate production resources being developed to meet the long-term projected increasing demand for uranium enrichment facilities?

What governmental actions (and associated costs) would be required to facilitate private entry and to ensure future supply?

What would be the implications of private control of enrichment for U.S. foreign policy, trade, and energy policies, domestic and international nuclear safeguards, and non-proliferation?

What are the costs and implications of the U.S. governmental commitments to worldwide supply, assurance of timely availability, and nondiscriminatory access? How can it be ensured that the private sector would meet and sustain such commitments, and what would be the foreign policy implications if these commitments were not met?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ XGBS

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What are the prospects and implications (for example, for trade benefits and proliferation) if private activity were to result in business arrangements abroad through which enriching technology becomes subject to transfer, sale or licensing?

Can satisfactory oversight of private industry be established and adequate mechanisms developed to facilitate the planning and long-range actions necessary to maintain the appropriate U.S. stockpile of enriched uranium?

What are the organizational alternatives to private assumption of enriching services? (Each alternative should include discussion of its legislative, cost, and budget implications, probable Congressional and utility reaction, and impact on the nuclear industry.)

Based on the above analysis and other relevant factors, the study should outline the policy options open to the President and their advantages and disadvantages.

This study should be carried out by an Ad Hoc Group comprised of representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. The study should be conducted on a close-hold basis. It should be forwarded to the President for his consideration no later than October 1, 1974.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy
The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



Scawcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

September 11, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 210

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Review of Japan Policy for the President's Visit to
 Japan

In anticipation of his planned visit to Japan, the President has asked for a full review and reexamination of policy issues which may arise during his meetings with Japanese leaders. The review should take as its point of departure the definition of interests and objectives contained in the response to NSSM 172. It should define and evaluate alternative policies to support these objectives.

The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration of the following:

Multilateral Issues

- U.S. -Japanese cooperation in the development of Siberian resources.
- The Japanese role in international cooperation on energy matters, including world-wide payment deficits for petroleum.
- The Japanese role in international cooperation on trade and monetary reform.
- The future Japanese role in Asia, particularly Korea and Indochina.
- The future of the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and Western Europe.
- Nuclear nonproliferation.

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- 2 -

Bilateral Issues

- U.S. agricultural export guarantees or long-term contracts.
- Fisheries.
- U.S. - Japanese defense cooperation, including possible complementarity.
- Trade and investment problems.
- Japanese participation in a uranium enrichment facility in the United States, and Japanese access to U.S. uranium enrichment services.
- Technological cooperation.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia with appropriate representation of other agencies. The study should be submitted by October 4, 1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy
The Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy

SECRET/EXDIS XGDS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

TOP SECRET (DS)

October 8, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 211

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea

The President has requested a study of our Security Assistance Program for the Republic of Korea. The study should define basic U.S. objectives as regards our security assistance to South Korea, and should then set forth the policy options that will give effect to these objectives.

The study should assume no significant changes in the level or missions of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition to new security arrangements following the termination of the United Nations Command.

The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration of the following issues:

- Should a termination date be set for grant military assistance, and if so, what should that date be?
- Should the rate of shift from grant military assistance to FMS credits, defined in NSDM 227, be accelerated and, if so, what should the new rate be?
- What types and numbers of high performance aircraft should be included in the Korean Force Modernization Program?
- What modifications, if any, should be made in the five-year Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea prescribed in NSDM 129?

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
Authority NSC stat 11/1/98

By 1st RLF Date 2/4/96

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The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia. The study should be submitted no later than November 1, 1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET (GDS)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) (3)~~

October 8, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 212

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U. S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China

The President has directed a study of U. S. policy on the transfer of American military equipment to the Republic of China over the next three to five years. The study should define relevant U. S. interests and objectives, and should be based upon the following assumptions:

- That the process of normalization in U. S. - PRC relations will continue.
- That there will be no radical change in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
- That the U. S. defense commitment to the Republic of China will continue.

The issues to be examined in the study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- The threat to the security of Taiwan over this period.
- The roles of U. S. and ROC forces in deterring and defending against a possible PRC attack on Taiwan and the Pescadores.
- In light of these roles, the principal deficiencies in ROC defensive capabilities.

-- In light of these deficiencies, and taking into account the constraints posed by the continuing normalization of U. S. - PRC relations, the study should define and evaluate policy options for further transfers of U. S. military equipment to the ROC. The evaluation should include consideration of the ROC's economic and technological ability to support the acquisition and maintenance of new weapons systems, and should consider the possibility and feasibility of the ROC developing alternative sources of supply.

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
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NSC staff list, 1/28/90

by ut 2/14/96



The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia, which should be chaired by a representative of the Department of State. The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than November 1, 1974, for consideration by the Senior Review Group prior to consideration by the President.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

October 22, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 213

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Review of U. S. Assistance Policy and Programs for the Republic of Vietnam

The President has directed a comprehensive review of U. S. assistance policy and programs for the Republic of Vietnam. The study should examine current assistance policy and programs and possible alternative programs that could be pursued over the next five years.

The study should be accomplished in two parts.

Part I - Intelligence Appraisal

An intelligence appraisal of the internal and external military and political factors that may be major influences on the Republic of Vietnam during the next five years should be prepared. This appraisal should analyze anticipated enemy military, political and economic capabilities, objectives, and strategy in the Republic of Vietnam and the impact of other nations' probable actions toward Vietnam. The appraisal is intended to serve as the basis for a review of U. S. assistance policy and programs, their effectiveness and possible alternate courses of action.

This portion of the study should be performed by the intelligence community under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence and be completed by November 5, 1974.

Part II - Assistance Programs Review

Drawing on the analysis prepared in Part I, the study should (a) identify GVN capabilities to meet the threat to its security, (b) identify U. S.

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Authority NSC 640, 10/9/98

By LE NUS Date 11/2/98



military and economic assistance objectives, (c) assess the effectiveness of current U.S. assistance programs, (d) identify options for achieving U.S. assistance objectives over the next five years and (e) examine alternate sources of external assistance, where required. This portion of the study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration of the following:

- Projected alternative South Vietnamese force levels required to meet the threat identified in Part I and the impact of these levels on the viability of the Vietnamese economy and prospects for its development.
- An assessment of the GVN's ability to counter anticipated enemy strategy at various possible levels of military and economic assistance.
- The extent to which changes in GVN domestic economic policy or military strategy can make up for resource shortfalls in the face of the threat.
- Alternative organizational structures for administering U. S. economic and military assistance.

The study should present options for GVN economic policies and U. S. assistance policies which would complement each other and alternative aid flows from U. S. and third country sources to support those policies over the five year period. These options should be stated in sufficient detail to form the basis for appropriate programs to secure legislative approval and the support of other nations.

Part II of the study should be prepared on a closehold, need-to-know basis by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC Staff, and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State.

The completed study should be submitted by November 29, 1974 for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS



Gen. Secretariat

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 214

TO:

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
Executive Director, Council on International
Economic Policy
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Implications of US Participation in
Siberian Development

As part of his overall consideration of US-Soviet relations, the President has directed a review of the broad strategic, political and economic implications of US involvement in the development of Siberia, to include:

- a. the extent to which the Soviet Union will develop Siberia with or without outside assistance over the next 20 years;
- b. the strategic objectives of Soviet economic and military development plans for Siberia;
- c. the impact of Siberian development on Soviet energy needs and on the world energy market;
- d. the potential strategic, political and economic opportunities and risks for the US of alternative levels and modes of participation in Siberian development projects -- in particular, the question of transfer of technology, and the sale of equipment and materials versus construction by US firms of production facilities and processing plants;
- e. the political implications for our relations with Japan (and other friendly countries as deemed appropriate) of alternative levels of US financial and technical involvement in Soviet development efforts.

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The study should address other topics as appropriate or necessary.

The study should be conducted by an NSC Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and chaired by the representative of the Department of State. The study should be submitted not later than December 13, 1974 for review by the NSC Senior Review Group.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET (GDS)



Gen. Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~CONFIDENTIAL/GDS~~

January 25, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 216

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research
and Development Administration

SUBJECT: National Security Aspects of Releasing Safeguard
Procedures and Data on Nuclear Materials

There have been recent requests for public release of unclassified information relating to safeguard procedures that are used to protect and account for nuclear materials and the results of these procedures. Such information could possibly assist terrorists or other groups in the diversion, misuse, or threat of misuse of nuclear material, and could, as well, have international consequences. The President has therefore directed that a study be made of the question of the release of such information.

The study should include but not be limited to a review of the following issues relating to the release of information.

- the types of information involved, its sensitivity, and the criticality of the timing of release;
- possible international consequences, including relations with IAEA and impact on our non-proliferation strategy;
- the applicable regulations, practices, and laws, especially the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act;
- the available bases and mechanisms for the control of information; and
- proposals for alternate courses of action, including possible guidelines for the release of information.

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WT 2/4/75



CONFIDENTIAL/ALDS

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The study shall be carried out by an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Administrator of Energy Research and Development and comprising representatives of the addressees. The study should be coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and forwarded to the President for his consideration no later than March 28, 1975.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: William A. Anders
Chairman, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission

Director of Central Intelligence



CONFIDENTIAL/ALDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)~~

February 6, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 217

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Security Policy Toward Oman

The President has directed that a review and updating of past studies be carried out regarding United States Government security and strategic interests in Oman.

The study should:

- examine the political and strategic importance of Oman for the Persian Gulf and South Arabia, including the importance to the United States of Omani oil;
- review the continued viability of the US policy of regional cooperation in Oman and the Gulf, as set forth in NSDM 92 and 186, as the basis for maintaining security in the area;
- assess the need for the United States Government to expand its role in the training or equipping of Omani forces;
- assess the need for access to facilities on Masira or elsewhere in Oman to support possible US force deployments or for other military purposes in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea;
- determine the probable impact of an increased US military presence in Oman and the Gulf on those other states most directly concerned (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, South Yemen, Jordan, India, the UK and the USSR).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC 6800.1-1, 1/20/98
By: lit Date: 12/2/98



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)~~

- 2 -

Pending completion of this study, there should be no official or informal United States Government survey of facilities which might be used or needed by US aircraft on Masira Island, or of additional Omani military needs which might be met by US assistance.

The study, which should include recommendations where appropriate for changes in US policy toward Oman, should be carried out by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia and submitted not later than February 24, 1975. This study should be conducted on a close-hold basis.


Henry A. Kissinger

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

February 7, 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NSSM 217: Corrected Page One

The attached page one of NSSM 217 has been revised to correct the number of the NSDM in the third paragraph incorrectly cited as NSDM 168.

Will you please substitute the attached page one for the previously distributed page one and destroy the latter.


Joanne W. Davis
State Secretary

Attachment

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET

March 3, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 218

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence


SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward U. S. and Soviet Military
Access to Singapore

The President has directed a review of our policy toward U. S. and Soviet military access to Singapore. The study should assume that it remains a basic U. S. objective to minimize Soviet military access to Singapore and to preserve access to Singapore for U. S. Navy vessels and U. S. military aircraft and should:

-- Assess the present and prospective situation, especially in light of (a) the planned withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from Singapore, and (b) recent displays of Soviet interest in greater access to Singapore's naval facilities.

-- Define and evaluate U. S. policy options that would achieve the above objectives in this situation.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Inter-Departmental Group for East Asia, and should be submitted no later than March 31, 1975, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET - GDS

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EO 12356, Sec 3A

NSC 44c 11/4/99

By KAT NIPA, Date 2/24/95



Gen. Secowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~/CDS

March 14, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 219

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. -Iran Agreement on Cooperation in Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The President has directed a study of the issues involved in reaching an acceptable agreement with the Government of Iran which would allow nuclear commerce between the countries -- specifically, the sale of U.S. nuclear reactors and materials, Iranian investment in U.S. enrichment facilities, and other appropriate nuclear transactions in the future. The study should consider, but not be limited to, the following:

- The rationale of the current U.S. position, and the status and prospects for negotiating an Agreement on that basis.
- The potential impact of the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear development plans.
- Alternatives for a U.S. position, with pros and cons, including an assessment of the effect of each on our non-proliferation policy.
- The relation of nuclear commerce with Iran to the broader question of U.S. -Iran cooperation.
- The outlook for Congressional support of a U.S. -Iran Atomic Energy Agreement.

The study should be carried out by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the NSC, and submitted no later than March 19.

cc: Director of Central Intelligence

Henry A. Kissinger
Henry A. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4

~~SECRET~~/CDS

NSC Ltr. #1499
By KAH NARA, Dec 2/24/95



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS

March 26, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 220

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy in the Middle East

The President has directed that a study be conducted of United States interests, objectives, strategy and policy toward the Middle East in the light of recent developments. The study should address our bilateral relationships with the principal countries in the area as well as the diplomacy of settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It should take into account the impact of our Middle East policy on our relations with countries outside the area.

-- The study should reflect consideration of significant changes likely to take place in the region, within individual countries, and in the overall diplomacy of settlement.

-- The study should consider the likely policies of outside powers, particularly the USSR, the European Community, Japan and China, with respect to the Middle East over the next several months.

-- The study should examine closely the possibility of renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities and should make recommendations for U. S. policy in response to likely scenarios of renewed hostilities.

-- The study should focus on developing alternative policies and recommendations for United States bilateral and multilateral relations with the countries of the Middle East, and with other major powers with respect to the Middle East, in the diplomatic, political, economic and military fields.

This study should be carried out by an NSC Ad Hoc Group composed of representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the


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Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. It should be conducted on a close-hold basis and submitted not later than April 10 for consideration by the Senior Review Group prior to submission to the President.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET/EXDIS/XGDS

April 8, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 221

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Security Interests in the Azores

The President has directed a priority review of U.S. security interests in the Azores. The study should identify:

-- The political and military significance of U.S. base rights and facilities in the Azores in terms of their contributions to both U.S. and NATO security interests.

-- U.S. policy and options under the range of possible conditions including: continuation of existing base arrangements, a Portuguese request for more limited U.S. access and use, a Portuguese demand for U.S. withdrawal from the Azores, or a U.S. decision to withdraw.

-- Alternative arrangements, if required, for the transfer of essential Azores operations to other locations, including an examination of the military and political implications of such relocation, and the pros and cons associated with various relocation sites.

The study should take into account, as appropriate, the work already carried out in response to NSSMs 189, 196 and 208.

The President has directed that the study be undertaken by an ad hoc NSC interagency group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and a representative of the NSC staff and under the

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EO 12356, Sec. 3.4

NSC 11c. 11/4/94

By KSH NARA Date 2/24/95



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chairmanship of the representative of the Department of State. The study should be forwarded no later than April 14, 1975, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET/ENDIS/XGDS



Gen. Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/EXDIS

April 22, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 222

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. and Allied Security Policy in
Southern Europe

The President has directed a review of U.S. and Allied security policy in Southern Europe and along NATO's southern tier over the near- and mid-term. The study should examine the viability and effectiveness of U.S. and Allied security aims, arrangements, forces and bases in light of changes in the area, and should develop and assess U.S. and Allied near- and mid-term options.

The framework for the study should encompass:

-- Overall U.S. interests in the region, including the U.S. political, military and economic relationship with NATO, the EC, and Western European states;

-- U.S. security aims vis-a-vis the Soviets in the region; and

-- U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Balkan states.

The study should consider inter alia:

-- Present and potential changes in the area that bear on U.S. and Allied security policy, including domestic political developments and changes in external policies in Southern Europe, the evolution of Soviet capabilities, trends in Allied forces in the area, and the impact of economic factors, including energy, on the region;

-- The political and military implications of changes in Southern European membership or participation in NATO;

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

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by KAT KAS Date 2/24/95



-- The consequences of elimination or curtailment of U.S. and Allied bases and facilities in the area (taking into account the Azores study being carried out in response to NSSM 221);

-- Prospects for an increased Allied and Western European political and military role in the area;

-- The implications of new military and intelligence capabilities and technologies for U.S. force and base structure in the area.

The study should assume continuation of the current policy line in base negotiations with Portugal, Spain, and Greece and postulate a range of outcomes for purposes of analysis.

The study should be prepared on a priority, need-to-know basis by an NSC Ad Hoc Group composed of representatives of the addressees, the JCS and the NSC staff, and chaired by the representative of the Department of State. The completed study should be transmitted no later than May 28, 1975, for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



Gen. Scowcroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - XGDS (3)

May 19, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 223

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of U.S. Policy on Arms Transfers

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy on arms transfers for foreign nations.

The study should present a statistical study of the growth of U.S. transfers of both defense articles and services in the past four years, including both commercial and FMS sales cases and grant aid, and compare these transfers in monetary value, and types and quantities of equipment, with transfers by other nations. In making this comparison, the impact of inflation should be taken into account. An effort should also be made to estimate sales by the U.S. and other countries over the next four years.

The study should analyze long-term U.S. interests in the transfer of defense articles and services and propose alternative policies, including limits which might be applied to U.S. arms transfers unilaterally or in concert with other suppliers. The study should also review existing and proposed USG mechanisms for controlling arms sales.

The study should be conducted by an NSC Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC Staff. The study should be completed by June 20, 1976 for submission to the Senior Review Group for review prior to consideration by the President.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - XGDS (3)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA status list, 1/20/96

By lit NLF Date 2/9/96

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

May 26, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 224

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Angola

The President has directed a study of United States policy toward Angola. The study should analyze United States interests and objectives in Angola in both the immediate and post-independence future. The study should then project the possible ranges of political evolution in Angola, both before and after independence, and propose options for United States policies that take into account United States interests and objectives.

The study should examine, among others, the following elements:

- The potential for increased civil strife, or civil war, in Angola and its impact on the transition to independence;
- The relative political, economic and military strengths (and their political orientation) of the three independence movements and their leadership;
- The role of Portugal and neighboring African states, including South Africa, as well as an assessment of likely efforts on their part to shape the future of Angola;
- The extent of the involvement, past and future, of the Soviet Union and China in political developments in Angola;
- The prospects for and likely pattern of economic development in Angola and its need for development assistance or for aid in settling refugees;
- Possible role of international organizations (e.g., UN, OAU, UNICEF, and UNHCR) in promoting stability in Angola

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Authority: NSA Subject List, 1/28/99

By LT NLF Date 2/4/98




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and providing other assistance (e. g., refugee relief and resettlement); and

- Likely Congressional and public attitudes toward alternative United States policies.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa and be forwarded by June 30, 1975 to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for review by the Senior Review Group prior to consideration by the President.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

May 27, 1975

SECRET/NODIS

National Security Study Memorandum 225

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of U.S. Policy Toward Thailand

The President has directed an assessment of U.S. policy toward Thailand. The study should examine U.S. interests in Thailand, the U.S. objectives that flow from these interests over the next three to five years, and U.S. policy options designed to support these interests and objectives.

The study's consideration of factors bearing on U.S. interests and objectives should include, but should not necessarily be limited to, the following:

-- The current trends in basic Thai foreign policy, particularly as those trends affect the balance of power in Southeast Asia and the U.S. presence in Thailand.

-- The strength of significant factions within the Thai Government and their probable relative influence over Thai foreign policy.

-- Thailand's perception of the North Vietnamese and Chinese threats in the mid-term, and Thailand's probable approach to these threats.

-- Thailand's perception of its insurgency, and its probable efforts to cope with this problem.

-- Thailand's attitude towards American and other foreign investment, and its interests in trade with the United States.

-- The probable strategy toward Thailand of the Peoples Republic of China, North Vietnam and Cambodia.

The study's examination of policy issues should include, but should not necessarily be limited to, the following:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

NSC 114, 11/4/94

By 1024 NARA, Date 2/24/95



- The U.S. security commitment to Thailand.
- The U.S. force presence in Thailand, as it relates to regional security.
- U.S. security assistance to Thailand.
- Thailand's relations with other Southeast Asian states, and its position on Southeast Asian regional issues.
- Thailand's relations with North Vietnam, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, and the U.S. attitude toward these relations.
- U.S.-Thai economic relations.
- The U.S. position towards Thai internal political developments.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Inter-Departmental Group for East Asia, and should be submitted no later than June 30, 1975, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SECRET/NODIS

May 27, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 226

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

The President has directed an assessment of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The study should examine U.S. interests and objectives toward the Korean Peninsula, and the combined political and military strategy that would flow from these interests and objectives over the next three to five years.

The study should assume a continuation of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

The study's consideration of factors bearing on U.S. interests and objectives should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- The threat from North Korea, and the extent of support that North Korea is likely to get from the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and Third World countries.
- The impact of Indochina developments on North Korean and South Korean policies.
- The arms competition between the two Koreas.
- The diplomatic competition between the two Koreas, including the role of U. N. actions on the United Nations Command.
- The North-South dialogue.
- Japan's orientation toward North and South Korea and toward the U. S. security role in South Korea.

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DECLASSIFIED
EO 12356, Sec 3.4

NSC 12356, 11/4/98

by KAW NARA, Dec 2/29/95

The study's examination of policy issues should include, but should not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- The U.S. force presence in South Korea, and the termination of the United Nations Command.
- The U.S. response to North Korean aggression.
- U.S. military assistance, including the transfer of advanced weapons and technology and the South Korean interest in nuclear weapons development.
- The U.S. position toward the relative international standing of the two Koreas and toward great power relations with the Peninsula.
- The North-South dialogue, and how the major powers might relate to the process between the two Koreas.
- South Korea's future regional role in Northeast Asia.
- The U.S. position towards South Korea's internal political developments.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Inter-Departmental Group for East Asia, and should be submitted no later than June 30 1975, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET (XGDS)

July 16, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 227

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Security Policy Toward Turkey

The President has directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy toward Turkey be undertaken on a priority basis. The study should identify U.S. interests, including those interests as they relate to NATO, and offer recommendations for U.S. policy aimed at their protection, particularly in the context of bilateral negotiations that may be requested by Turkey on the status of U.S. installations in that country. The study should take into account such factors as:

- The nature of the U.S. military presence in Turkey, and its relationship to specific U.S. security interests;
- The relative priority of U.S. bases and facilities in terms of their contribution to U.S. and NATO security;
- Turkish objectives regarding the U.S. presence in the country and specific US-Turkish bilateral agreements;
- The presence of nuclear weapons in Turkey;
- Turkey's needs for economic and military assistance and possible U.S. initiatives to satisfy those needs;
- The impact of restoration of U.S. military aid to Turkey and a resolution of the Cyprus crisis on US-Turkish relations;
- The impact of US-Turkish bases and facilities negotiations on overall Turkish-NATO defense arrangements.

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Classified by Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

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E.O. 12356 Sec 3A.

NSC Dec. 11/19/94

By KAH NARA Date 2/29/95



SECRET (XGDS)

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The President has directed that the study be undertaken by an NSC inter-agency group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and a representative of the NSC staff and under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The study should be forwarded no later than August 1, 1975 for consideration.

Henry A. Kissinger
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, National Security Agency

SECRET (XGDS)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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~~SECRET~~ - XGPS

August 14, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 228

TO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of the Office of Management
and Budget
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, General Services
Administration

SUBJECT: Strategic and Critical Stockpile Planning Guidance

The President has directed a reassessment of the current Strategic and Critical Stockpile Planning Guidance (NSDM 203) in light of the strategic stockpile problem areas identified in response to NSSM 197/ CIEFSM 33 (Critical Imported Commodities), and Congressional criticism that current objectives are inadequate. The study should develop alternatives to the current planning guidance which take account of the problem areas and the Congressional criticism. The study should analyze:

- the impact on the US budget and on commodity markets of changes in sales, acquisition, and inventory maintenance which would result from each alternative;
- the adequacy and accuracy of the models employed to compute objectives;
- the effects of factors such as austerity, substitution, and production expansion in establishing the stockpile objectives for specific materials;
- shipping losses and reliability of suppliers;



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By Authority of Henry A. Kissinger

NSC Staff Report, 1/20/90
By let NCF Date 2/6/90

-- whether to hold stockpile materials in raw or upgraded forms;

-- whether specific materials should be added to or deleted from the present list of stockpile materials.

The study should be prepared by representatives of the addressees and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and chaired by the representative of the Administrator of General Services. The study should be forwarded not later than September 4, 1975 for consideration by the President.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Acting Director, Council on International Economic Policy



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

August 19, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 229

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Counsel to the President

SUBJECT: Review of the Management of
Classified National Security Information

The President has directed that a review be made of the management of classified national security information in the light of three years experience with Executive Order 11652, the passage of amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, and current Congressional consideration of legislation which would change the present system of executive branch management and control of classified national security information. The study should include an examination of:

- the effectiveness of Executive Order 11652 in meeting the goal of protecting national security information consistent with making the maximum amount of information available to the public;
- the current and potential longer range impact of amendments to the FOIA relating to the declassification and release of classified material;
- the impact of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Right of Privacy Act;
- the status and potential impact of legislation currently under Congressional consideration (including S. 1 and S. 5) relating to the classification system.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

6/24/98


CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER



Based upon the results of these reviews, the study should:

- Evaluate the need for and substance of changes in Executive Order 11652 or guidelines for preparation of a new executive order which would enhance the effectiveness of the current system.
- Submit recommendations concerning possible legislative action in the area of management and control of classified information.

This study will be prepared by an ad hoc group, including representatives of the addressees and chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The study should be submitted by September 30, 1975 for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Acting Chairman, Interagency Classification Review Committee



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

SECRET (GDS)

September 15, 1975


National Security Study Memorandum 230

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Establishment of U. S. Sinai Support Mission

The President has directed that a study be conducted regarding the establishment of a U. S. Sinai Support Mission pursuant to the U. S. Proposal of September 1, 1975, submitted in connection with the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of the same date. The study should analyze how best to organize and supervise the activities of a Sinai Support Mission and should develop appropriate recommendations for effecting the provisions of the Proposal.

The study should be carried out by an ad hoc group comprised of representatives of the addressees and chaired by the representative of the Department of State. The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not later than September 22, 1975, for consideration by the President.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NSC 14C 1/4/94

By K314 NARA Date 2/24/95

SECRET (GDS)

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) (3)

October 7, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 231

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Israeli Military Requests

The President has directed a study of the requests of the Government of Israel for military and intelligence equipment and technology from the United States. The purpose of the study is to review and assess these requests within the broad context of United States strategic, diplomatic and economic interests.

The Study should first determine the impact upon Israeli military capabilities of the response to the MATMON-B Urgent List, made pursuant to NSDM 270, dated September 24, 1974. Starting with this revised assessment of Israeli capabilities as a base, the study should consider, but not be limited to, the following military and economic factors:

- A. A comparison of the military capabilities of Israel and the Arab States likely to participate in a future Middle East conflict, as well as the estimated threat to Israel in both worst case and probable case scenarios.
- B. The impact on Israel's military capabilities and the strategic balance in the area of the release of all equipment and technology approved prior to March 26, 1975, which had been held by the Department of Defense or Munitions Control during the reassessment process.
- C. The additional impact upon Israel's military capabilities and the strategic balance in the area of the provision to or co-production by Israel of all equipment and technology contained in Israel's current overall request list (MATMON-B

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4.

NSC #14194

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) (3)
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

By KSH NARA Date 2/24/95



1975 (MN-2-92) and subsequent requests), assuming that equipment is made available from production only. The study should identify those items or procedures with regard to which release, co-production or joint research and development would compromise sensitive US technology, or have major political, military, or economic impact within the US. In addition, the study should examine existing guidelines for military co-production and joint research and development with Israel and make recommendations for their revision, if warranted.

D. An assessment of the likelihood, in light of recent Israeli arms requests, that Israel will increase the scope of the overall MATMON-B program.

E. The impact upon outstanding US foreign military sales commitments and anticipated commitments of the provision of items requested in the overall Israeli equipment list from production.

F. The impact of sales to Israel of items requested in the overall Israeli equipment list upon future Israeli assistance needs, including the estimated additional annual support costs to Israel of such sales.

In addition to the above military and economic factors, the Study should consider the political effects of providing the requested military equipment, in particular:

A. The potential such equipment poses for accelerating the arms race in the Middle East, particularly the stimulation of greater Arab pressure for arms from the US or the USSR to match improvements in the Israeli military posture.

B. The effect upon the peace settlement process, including the potential of the provision of such equipment for reducing the incentives by Israel and/or the Arab States to negotiate a settlement.

Based on the assessment of the foregoing military, economic and political factors, the Study should suggest a long-term program of




security assistance to Israel providing for an adequate but not destabilizing Israeli force level, if different from the MATMON-B force. Within this force framework, the Study should also suggest at least two alternative responses to the current (1975-1976) Israeli equipment and technology request, including different spacing of delivery schedules. The Study should clearly delineate the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative course of action.

Finally, the Study should review current interagency procedures for processing all arms requests by Israel and other Middle East countries through commercial or FMS channels, as well as current USG-GOI interface procedures on arms procurement and recommend any appropriate improvement in such procedures.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the addressees and the NSC Staff, and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of Defense. The Study should be completed by November 1, 1975 for consideration by the Senior Review Group, prior to its submission to the President.

This Study should be conducted on a close-hold, need-to-know basis.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget



Gen. Saarnio

~~SECRET/ONS~~

October 17, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 232

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Svalbard (Spitzbergen)

The President has directed that a comprehensive review be undertaken of U.S. policy toward the Norwegian Arctic dependency known as Svalbard. The study should examine U.S. strategic, economic and political interests (including the weight and importance of those interests), legal questions posed by Norway's boundary claims relevant to our interests in the archipelago and our positions in the law of the sea negotiations, and the attitudes of our Allies who have rights under the 1920 Spitzbergen Treaty. The study should provide recommendations for U.S. policy toward Svalbard, taking into account U.S., Soviet, Norwegian and Allied interests in the area.

The President has directed that the study be undertaken by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. The study should be forwarded no later than December 1, 1975 for consideration by the Senior Review Group.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

~~SECRET/ONS~~

at 2/4/98.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET (GDS)

October 23, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 233

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Future of Kagnev Station

In view of the continued internal security problems in Ethiopia, their impact on the U. S. operation at Kagnev Station, and the Ethiopian Government's request that we discuss a date for the station's closure, the President has directed a review of U. S. interests in a continued presence at Kagnev Station.

The study should:

- Describe in detail the strategic, tactical and operational considerations supporting continued use of the Kagnev facility, together with an assessment of the feasibility of performing its functions from alternate locations and the effect of terminating them.
- Assess how United States interests in Ethiopia and regional stability may be affected by continued presence in or, alternatively, departure from Kagnev.
- Estimate the likelihood and extent of continued military conflict between the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean insurgency and the extent to which our Kagnev facility and personnel will continue to be targets in that conflict.

Based upon the assessment of the foregoing and any other relevant considerations, the study should determine the value of Kagnev to the United States and evaluate alternate policies for the future of the base and the functions it performs.

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E.O. 12355, Sec. 2.4

NSC Dec 11/2/94

By KSH RRA, Date 2/28/95

SECRET (GDS)

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The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by the representative of the Secretary of Defense and including representatives of the addresses and the National Security Council Staff. Differing agency judgments should be set forth clearly.

The study should be submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group by November 6.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET (GDS)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~
XGDS(3)

December 13, 1975

National Security Study Memorandum 234

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Angola

The President has directed a review of United States interests and objectives in and policy toward Angola.

The study should describe United States political, economic and strategic interests in Angola and assess:

- Similar interests of other powers -- Soviet, PRC, or other.
- The immediate and longer-range prospects for Angola with emphasis on the likelihood of continued armed conflict, the chances that either the MPLA or FNLA/UNITA will gain a dominant political role, and the policies and goals likely to be followed in each instance.
- The consequences to the United States of Angola's being governed by those whose interests are inimical to the United States. In this context, the study should assess whether denial of a military victory by the MPLA is essential to the achievement of United States objectives.
- The impact of various outcomes in Angola on United States interests in Africa as a whole, and in particular in the neighboring states, such as Zaire and Zambia, and southern Africa.
- The probability (and extent) of OAU and/or UN intervention, or efforts to influence the conflict.
- The impact on United States interests in Africa and elsewhere of continuing Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.

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By NSC Staff 1/28/98

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


- The impact on United States-Soviet relations of continued Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.
- The interest/concern of other powers - NATO, Germany, France, UK - with United States and Soviet intervention in Angola.
- Whether United States interests warrant support of South African government efforts to influence the outcome in Angola. Evaluate probability and consequence of United States direct or indirect policy change toward South Africa.

Based upon the foregoing assessments, the study should evaluate alternative United States policies toward Angola and present options for achieving United States objectives to include pros and cons for each. The options should take into account the time available for action.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the addressees and the National Security Council staff and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. Knowledge of the study and participation in its preparation should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis. Any additional participation should be specifically approved by the Chairman of the Group. Differing agency judgments should be clearly set forth.

The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than January 2, 1976.


Brent Scowcroft



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ QDS

January 15, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 235

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of U.S. Interests and Security Objectives
in the Asia-Pacific Region -- Issue: Military
Bases Negotiations with the Philippines

The President has directed an assessment of U.S. security interests, objectives, and strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific area over the next three to five years, together with the role of U.S. bases in the Philippines in supporting these security interests and objectives.

1. The study should review U.S. interests and objectives in the region during the next three to five years in light of the following:

- a. The end of the Indochina conflict.
- b. US relations with ASEAN countries and the potential role of ASEAN in the security of the region.
- c. The phase-out of SEATO.
- d. Japan's objectives and potential as a political and economic force in Asia.
- e. The policies, intentions, and capabilities of the People's Republic of China.
- f. Vietnamese capabilities and intentions.
- g. Soviet capabilities and intentions in the region.
- h. The Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese rivalries in Southeast Asia.

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DECLASSIFIED

REVIEW: Also status report, 1/29/98

By 115 NLF Date 2/4/98

2. Based upon the above assessment, the study should evaluate the role of our air, naval, and intelligence presence in the Philippines and present the issues and options to be addressed in the upcoming base negotiations with the Philippines.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and forwarded no later than February 4, 1976 for consideration by the Senior Review Group prior to transmittal to the President.

Brent Scowcroft
Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



Gen. Beaucroft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 16, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 236

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Acting Executive Director, Council on
 International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: United States Policy on Export-Import Bank Loans
 for South Africa

The President has directed a review of United States policy toward Export-Import Bank loans for exports to South Africa.

The study should describe current United States policy and the rationale for continuing or modifying that policy, taking into account the following:

- the economic benefits and costs of an Export-Import Bank policy change, with particular attention to the extent of competitive disadvantage United States business firms presently have in exporting to South Africa;
- the short and long term consequences of a changed policy for overall United States interests in Africa and elsewhere;
- the policies of other nations with regard to the use of government export credit agencies for transactions with South Africa;
- United States policy toward South Africa and changes in that policy implied by possible Export-Import Bank policy revisions;
- U.S. relations with other African countries and the effect of a change in Export-Import Bank policy on those relations.

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
By: NSC Staff report, 1/28/98
By: let NSC Staff 8/4/98

- the extent to which the present unstable condition in southern Africa would be affected by a policy change;
- Likely reaction within the United States to a change in United States policy.

Based upon the foregoing assessment, the study should evaluate alternative United States policy options with regard to Export-Import Bank loan policies in South Africa including pros and cons for each.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the addressees and the National Security Council staff and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. Where appropriate, a representative of the Chairman, Export-Import Bank should be invited to participate in the meetings of the ad hoc group. Knowledge of the study and participation in its preparation should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis. Any additional participation should be specifically approved by the Chairman of the Group.

The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than January 30, 1976.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Export-Import Bank



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 5, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum No. 237

Council on International Economic Policy Study Memorandum No. 38

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Administrator, Federal Energy
 Administration
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. International Energy Policy

The President has directed that a study be undertaken of measures to ensure a reliable supply of required energy imports at reasonable prices over the next five years. The study should especially consider possibilities for influencing pricing and production decisions in exporting nations.

The study should address the following:

- The likely level of U.S. energy import dependence over the next five years.
- Possibilities for diversifying imports of energy by type and source and for encouraging increased production capacity in countries willing to export more oil.
- The degree to which diversification and increased production could influence OPEC pricing decisions and improve the security of supply for the United States and our allies.
- The international and internal dynamics of the OPEC cartel and the motivations and objectives of its more important members, including possible reasons for and likelihood of embargoes or price increases over the next five years.

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



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- The factors most likely to influence the cartel's decisions, including the anticipated level of world demand for OPEC oil, the likely balance of trade positions of OPEC countries over the next five years, strategies they may follow to increase income and ways in which the United States might influence those strategies to its advantage, including the use of bilateral agreements.
- Means to strengthen consumer solidarity in the IEA.
- Possibilities for the United States to encourage restraints in OPEC pricing over the near term, including examination of possibilities for unilateral action, multilateral action, use of the CIEC, and use of the IEA.

The study should contain options and recommendations on the above issues. It should be conducted by representatives of the addressees, the National Security Council Staff and the Staff of the Council on International Economic Policy, and be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State. The report should be submitted to the President by March 15, 1976.


John M. Dunn
Acting Executive Director
Council on International
Economic Policy


Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ GDS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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~~SECRET~~ GDS

February 13, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 238

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf

The President has directed a study of U.S. security policy toward the Persian Gulf area. The purpose of this study will be to examine U.S. political and strategic goals in the area and develop policy alternatives for the near and medium term, with particular emphasis on Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Beginning with an overview of U.S. policy and the evolution of the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf since 1969, the study should provide a comprehensive assessment of the key factors likely to influence the nature of our policy toward the region as a whole and key individual states over the next ten years. This analysis should include, inter alia, discussion of the following:

1. The strategic, economic and political importance to the United States of the area and key individual countries over the next ten years, including the importance of oil, financial resources, and the need for access to bases and installations.
2. The prospects for stability and moderation in key Persian Gulf nations, including the political impact of foreign manpower imports and rapid modernization, the effect of intra-area differences, the prospect for intra-area cooperation in maintaining Gulf security, and the effect of Soviet influence.

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Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1984.

3. The potential economic and political influence in the area of outside powers (Western Europe/Japan and the USSR) and the possibilities of their replacing the U.S. to a significant degree in various areas of activity or individual countries.
4. The liabilities and benefits to the U.S. of U.S. arms policy in the Persian Gulf in the short and long term, including the strain on the economies and social structures of key states by large arms acquisitions and related U.S. presence, the impact on our own defense establishment, the changing attitude of Congress toward arms sales and military training, and the effect on the attitudes of key Persian Gulf countries toward the U.S.

Drawing on the foregoing analysis, the study should develop policy options for the U.S. in the Persian Gulf area with respect to U.S. objectives in the following areas:

- Arms supply and training.
- Bases and installations.
- Technology transfer and co-production.
- Economic policies.
- Regional relationships.
- Procedures for better implementation of existing and future policies within the United States Government.

The study should be undertaken by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group. The study should be submitted for consideration by the Senior Review Group no later than March 15, 1976.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~ QDS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

March 22, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 239

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Future of the French Territory of the Afars
and the Issas (FTAI)

The French Government has announced its intention to grant independence to the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (FTAI). In light of this decision and increased tension among the states most directly concerned with the future of FTAI, the President has directed a study of the independence process for the FTAI and policy options for the United States.

Drawing as appropriate on the study on the Horn of Africa done earlier in response to NSSM 184, the study should:

- Define and assess United States interests in the Horn and analyze how these interests may be affected by the coming independence of the FTAI.
- Examine various possible scenarios for the achievement of the independence of the FTAI.
- Describe and analyze the political groups and leadership in the FTAI and their likely roles in the independence process and beyond.
- Assess French, Somali, and Ethiopian interests and intentions regarding the FTAI and its forthcoming independence.
- Assess the impact the independence process will have on Somali/Ethiopian relations, on the internal security of those two states, and on U.S./French interests in northern Africa.

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


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- Examining the interests and intentions with regard to the FTAI of interested Arab states, the USSR, Cuba and the People's Republic of China. Also examine OAU and UN attitudes toward independence of the FTAI and possible roles they might play in the independence process.

Based upon the foregoing, the study should evaluate U. S. goals with regard to the FTAI and alternative policy options for achieving those goals. The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. The study should be submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group by April 23, 1976.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

April 9, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 240

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Alternative Siting for Thai-based Operations

The withdrawal of US forces from Thailand necessitates a prompt determination of which activities formerly conducted there should be continued and where they should be relocated. A study should therefore be undertaken which will identify activities now carried on in Thailand which should be continued and make recommendations as to where those activities should be transferred. In view of the apparent suitability of Singapore as a location for some of these activities and of recent indications of interest by the Government of Singapore in closer cooperation with the United States on facilities and arms matters, the study should examine in particular the possibility and desirability of relocating Thai-based activities in Singapore.

The study should examine the advantages and disadvantages and present options and recommendations for each relocation site. The study should also make recommendations as to the approach to be taken toward the government of each country proposed as a relocation site to include the role and content of military assistance or sales programs.

The study should be prepared by a working group consisting of representatives of the addressees and chaired by the representative of the Department of Defense. It should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by April 19 for review by principals prior to submission to the President.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Classified by Brent Scowcroft
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)



DECLASSIFIED

Re: Asst. Secy. 4 pt. 1/28/98
By 1st NLF Date 2/4/98

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

April 21, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 241

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: United States Policy in Southern Africa

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. The study should develop policy options for the United States, based on a thorough analysis of all relevant factors, and should include:


- A definition of United States interests in Southern Africa and an analysis of how these interests are affected by various changes in Southern Africa.
- An examination of the question of majority rule in Rhodesia, including an assessment of the likelihood and consequences of violent change, the role of major political groups and leadership in black Rhodesia, and the likely role of neighboring states, the USSR, Cuba and the People's Republic of China. The study should also examine possible roles for the OAU and the UN.
- A description of possible scenarios for a settlement of the Namibian problem, including an analysis of the likelihood of increased insurgency and of the internal political groups and leaders in Namibia. The study should also include an examination of: attitudes toward Namibian independence on the part of South Africa and other neighboring African states; the likely Soviet/Cuban role; and the possibilities for increased UN actions to achieve Namibia's independence.

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- An analysis of the impact that majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia is likely to have on South Africa, with specific emphasis on its internal policies, and on United States interests in South Africa.

Based upon the foregoing, the study should propose United States goals with regard to Southern Africa and alternative policy options -- both immediate and longer term -- for achieving those goals. The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa and should be submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group by May 21, 1976.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505~~SECRET/EXDIALXGDS~~

May 4, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 242

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward Italy

The President has directed a priority review of U. S. policy toward Italy in the near-term. The study should consider U. S. policy and options, based on an analysis of all pertinent factors, in the event that national elections in Italy result in the participation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the Italian government. The study should include:

... A brief definition of United States security, foreign policy and economic interests in Italy and an analysis of how these interests and those of NATO might be affected by Communist participation in Italy's national government; and

... A description of the election outcome most likely to lead to participation of the Italian Communists in the national government.

In connection with the possible inclusion of the PCI in Italy's national government, the study should identify and recommend:

... Possible changes in present U. S. policy toward Italy, particularly in such areas as U. S. assistance programs and bilateral consultations; and

... Possible steps by the United States in concert with the other members of the Alliance with respect to Italy's role and participation in NATO.

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The study should be undertaken by the Interdepartmental Group for Europe and submitted not later than June 7, 1976, for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.

Brent Scowcroft
Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET/EXDIS/XCDS~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL - GDS~~

May 10, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 243

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: MAAG Requirement Study

The President has directed a study of the continuing U.S. requirement for Military Assistance Advisory Groups after FY 1977, with a view to requesting Congressional authorization for specific MAAGs in FY 1977 Security Assistance Legislation.

Taking into account, inter alia, the views of Chiefs of Mission abroad, the study should identify those countries in which the presence of MAAGs after FY 1977 is a high priority requirement in terms of U.S. interests, those in which such presence is desirable but of lesser priority, and those in which MAAGs will no longer be required. In the case of each MAAG it recommends be continued, the study should include full justification, estimated number of personnel needed and the cost to both the United States and the host government.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the study should present options and alternatives for MAAG presence abroad after FY 1977, with the advantages and drawbacks in each case.

The study will be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs, and should include, in addition to normal membership, a representative of the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

The study should be forwarded for review by the Senior Review Group as soon as possible, but no later than June 1, 1976.

Brant Scott
Brant Scott

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Declassified
December 31, 1982.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

July 24, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 244

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Administrator, General Services
Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. Civil Defense Policy

The President has directed a review of U.S. civil defense policy as set forth in NSDM 184, dated August 14, 1972. The study should reflect the impact on civil defense policy of international political and military developments since NSDM 184 was issued and take into account the current status of U.S. and Soviet civil defense programs, their potential impact on the strategic nuclear balance, and their implications for our flexible nuclear options strategy (NSDM 242).

The study should review our current civil defense program, its effectiveness and cost, and propose a range of alternative civil defense policies and accompanying programs, including their effectiveness and costs. In addition to the above considerations, the review should take into account, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- Fallout shelters and emergency food and medical supplies.
- Civil defense warning and communications.
- Strategic evacuation of urban areas.
- Protection of key industrial installations.
- Education programs and materials
- The appropriate relationship between civil defense and natural disaster preparedness programs.


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67 2/4/80



-- The organizational structure for management of civil defense activities.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the recipients of this memorandum and chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the ad hoc group should draw upon other Departments and Agencies for assistance in those portions of the study dealing with substance in their areas of interest. The study report should be submitted by September 30, 1976, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to consideration by the President.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



Gen. Secoroff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

August 3, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 245


TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget
 The Director, United States Information Agency
 The Director, Board for International Broadcasting

SUBJECT: President's Report to Congress Concerning
 International Broadcast Facilities

The Fiscal Year 1977 Foreign Relations Authorization Act requires that the President submit to Congress by January 31, 1977 a report on steps that might be taken to improve the effectiveness of USG funded international broadcasting facilities, encompassing both greater cooperation among U.S. broadcasters and the feasibility of sharing facilities with foreign countries. In order to comply with the requirements of the Act, a number of important issues must be addressed, including the advisability of facility-sharing by Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). The President has therefore directed that a study be made of measures that might be taken to improve the effectiveness of U.S. funded international broadcasting and the impact such measures would have on current and future USG funded information exchange programs. This study should consider, but not necessarily be limited to:

- The respective missions of VOA and RFE with regard to Eastern Europe and VOA and RL with regard to the USSR. The missions should be clearly defined in terms of both political objectives and basic program content.
- The advisability of VOA and RFE/RL sharing each other's facilities, including the possible impact of such sharing on other U.S. international information and exchange programs.

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652.
Automatically declassified on
December 31, 1982.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

Oct 24/78.

- A comparison of broadcast range (distance), quality (clarity of signal), and audience size of (1) VOA and RFE in Eastern Europe, and (2) VOA and RL in USSR as a basis for determining ways in which to reduce competition and duplication.
- A review of language priorities (target audiences) for U.S. international broadcasting based on current and anticipated program orientation by both VOA and RFE/RL.
- Measures to manage and coordinate more efficiently current and planned international broadcasting transmission facilities.
- The feasibility of negotiating with other nations the mutual use of their and U.S. facilities. In this regard, a survey should be made of relevant Allied broadcast operations and facilities, especially the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, in order to explore possible facility-sharing arrangements with U.S. broadcasters.
- The advisability and feasibility of extending broadcasting operations to additional countries where access to information is restricted by the policies of the governments of such countries.

This study should be prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee and should include policy options and recommendations as appropriate. The study should include as an annex the report by the President required by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1977. The study should be submitted by October 1, 1976, for consideration by the President.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~ (CDS)

September 2, 1976

Ret. Work

National Security Study Memorandum 246

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: National Defense Policy and Military Posture

I would like a thorough review and analysis of our national defense policy and military posture. This review should consider in detail the security and foreign policy impact of a range of alternative strategies for our strategic and general purpose forces.

The review should address but not necessarily be limited to the following:

- The current and projected threat to the United States, its allies and U.S. security interest throughout the world.
- Foreign policy objectives and definable trends which influence these objectives.
- The overall defense posture necessary to assure U.S. security and foreign policy interests, including the desired balance between strategic and general purpose forces, manpower objectives, and preparedness.
- Arms control considerations and implications.
- Budgetary considerations and implications.

The study should be conducted under the aegis of the NSC Defense Review Panel. The study group should be composed of representatives of the

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WJH



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- 2 -

recipients of this memorandum and chaired by a representative of the Chairman of the NSC Defense Review Panel.

An interim report should be submitted for my consideration not later than November 15, 1976, and a final report not later than December 1, 1976.

Herold R. Ford

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Selective Service System
The Administrator, General Services Administration

~~SECRET (GDS)~~



~~SECRET~~ SCOWCROFT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 18, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 247
Economic Policy Board Study Memorandum 1

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward East-West Economic Relations

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy toward East-West economic relations.

The study should address, but need not be limited to, the following questions, drawing on work undertaken by the East-West Foreign Trade Board and its working group:

-- What are U.S. economic interests in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? How have they evolved over the last ten years and what is the projection over the next ten years? Are all opportunities being exploited in pursuit of those interests, and if not, what are the constraints? What problems, with Eastern European countries, and with our allies, could arise in pursuing these opportunities?

-- What are the economic interests of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the U.S. and the West? How important are they in relation to the national objectives of these countries? What problems or constraints -- internal, with their allies, and with the West -- do they have in pursuing their economic interest?

XGDS of E. O. 11652 by authority
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption
Category Section 5(B)(3)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ (XGDS) (3) Authority: AISC status updt. 1/28/98
By: WJ NLF Date: 2/4/98



-- What are the major impediments to more normal economic relations between market and non-market economies? What constitutes effective economic reciprocity in East-West economic relations? What measures should the U.S. take with other industrialized democracies, in multilateral forums and bilaterally with non-market economies, to help ensure effective reciprocity and to deal with the problem of disruption or unfair trade practices resulting from trade with non-market economy countries?

-- How, and to what degree, could economic relations between the industrialized Western nations and Eastern nations be used to pursue non-economic policy interests in the short and long-term future, and at what costs to our own economic interests? What would be the principal instruments of economic leverage? To what degree and under what circumstances might they be most effective and which non-economic interests are appropriate and susceptible to such economic leverage? How, and to what degree, could the U.S. exert effective leverage in the absence of a common approach by the major industrialized democracies, and at what costs to our economic and other interests?

-- How, and to what degree, could the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union collectively or separately use economic relations with the industrialized nations to achieve economic or non-economic objectives inimical to the interests of the U.S. and the West? What actions might we take unilaterally or in cooperation with the other industrial democracies to inhibit the use of such economic leverage?

-- In formulating our economic policies, to what extent is it desirable to distinguish among the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? What measures could be taken by the U.S., and the industrialized democracies as a whole, to use to our advantage the diversity of interests and needs among Eastern countries?

-- What are the costs and benefits of attempting to bring the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries into the process of assisting development in the Third World or more active involvement in other economic issues? What policy measures could or should be taken to encourage this type of Eastern involvement in the global economy?


This study should be prepared by representatives of the addressees and of the Assistants to the President for Economic Affairs and



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National Security Affairs. It should be co-chaired by representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury. The study group should work closely with the Deputies' Working Group of the East-West Foreign Trade Board, drawing on work already completed and underway. It should report its results for comment to the Board, the NSC, and EPB by December 10. The final study should be ready for submission to the President by December 24.



L. William Seidman
Assistant to the President
for Economic Affairs



Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

cc: The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



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November 13, 1976

National Security Study Memorandum 248

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: United States Coals in Relation to Ethiopia

In the light of the dramatic changes which have occurred in Ethiopia since Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in September 1974, the President has directed a brief study of United States policy options, and the underlying assumptions, regarding the state of our future relations with Ethiopia.

The study should draw as appropriate on the studies under NSSMs 239 and 184, and take account of more recent assessments of the situation. The study should:

- Review current and possible future United States interests, objectives and policy in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area, including military and economic assistance programs.
- Assess the internal security and stability of Ethiopia and its present government.
- Assess current Ethiopian policy toward the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Ethiopia's African and Arab neighbors.
- Assess the internal problems Ethiopia faces and the role Ethiopia might play in the Horn of Africa, and the larger African scene, over the next year.

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LH 2/14/98

Classified by Brent Scowcroft



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- Assess Soviet policy toward Ethiopia, Somalia and the FTAL.
- Assess the significance of Ethiopia to United States political, economic and military policy in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area.

The study should determine United States goals with regard to Ethiopia and policy options for achieving these goals. The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa and should be completed by December 10.

William G. McGuffee
Brent Scowcroft

- Review the current status of the Ethiopian situation and the role of the United States in the Horn of Africa.
- Assess the significance of Ethiopia to United States political, economic and military policy in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area.
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- Assess the significance of Ethiopia to United States political, economic and military policy in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area.

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